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CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF EU MEMBERSHIP:
A VIEW FROM THE COMMISSION
Frank Hoffmeister∗
Summary: This article reviews the constitutional implications of EU 
membership from a European Commission perspective. 
It fi rst recalls the ratifi cation procedures in both the old and the new 
Member States. The author identifi es fi ve different groups in this re-
gard. A few Member States apply constitutional provisions on the 
ratifi cation of international treaties. Others have recourse to a clause 
which refers to limitations of national sovereignty. The vast majority 
ratify the founding treaties or the Accession Treaty on the basis of a 
transfer/delegation of powers clause, or use a clause allowing the 
common exercise of powers. Finally, some Member States apply spe-
cial constitutional procedures to bring about EU membership. Despite 
these theoretical differences, their impact on the actual procedure is 
less signifi cant. Basically, European treaties are either ratifi ed as 
other international treaties, or the required majorities in Parliament 
for ratifi cation rises compared to the parliamentary majorities needed 
for ordinary international treaties. Sometimes, the need to hold an ad-
ditional referendum arises, or special constitutional procedures need 
to be fulfi lled. 
Second, the article compares the domestic rank of European law. It 
shows that virtually all 27 Member States accept the supremacy of 
Community law over national statutes. This can be deduced from the 
text of the integration clauses or their function. The situation is differ-
ent when it comes to the relationship between Community law and 
national constitutional law. Here, supremacy of Community law is ei-
ther rejected, accepted or put under a reserve as regards basic consti-
tutional principles. 
Third, the paper lists specifi c constitutional clauses relating to EU mat-
ters. It shows that a number of Member States changed their constitu-
tions to allow for voting rights for EU citizens in local elections. Fur-
thermore, constitutional prohibitions to extradite nationals were lifted 
to be able to comply with the European Arrest Warrant. Moreover, 
bans on foreigners acquiring real property were abolished, as they 
were not compatible with the free movement of capital. Community 
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rules on economic and monetary union triggered several amendments 
related to the independence and function of national banks. Finally, 
a few candidate countries modifi ed their constitutions to align them-
selves with a rising corpus of ‘constitutional acquis’ relating to the 
independence of the judiciary. 
The article concludes that the European Commission does not pre-
scribe a specifi c method on how a candidate should address these 
issues. Rather, during the negotiations, it points to certain shortcom-
ings as they arise in the negotiation chapters. There is an obligation 
of result to provide for the supremacy of Community law by accession. 
The choice on how and when to opt for a constitutional model which is 
best reconcilable with the candidate’s own national tradition certainly 
remains in the hands of the democratically elected representatives of 
the candidate country itself. 
I. Introduction
When a candidate country joins the European Union, European law1 
becomes applicable in the new Member State under the conditions laid 
down in the Treaty of Accession.2 Whereas there is a duty of loyalty for 
Member States to carry out obligations arising under the second or third 
pillar of the European Union,3 the respective obligations under the fi rst 
pillar have long been recognised as being of particular signifi cance. In its 
opinions on previous enlargements, the European Commission stressed, 
among other things, that ‘Community law takes precedence over any 
national provisions which may confl ict with it’ (emphasis added).4 This 
dictum refl ects the long-standing jurisprudence of the European Court 
1  Under Article 1 (3) of the Treaty Establishing the European Union, the European Union 
is founded on the European Communities, supplemented by the policies and forms of coop-
eration established under the EU Treaty. In this contribution, the term ‘European law’ will 
be used to describe the law arising from all three pillars. Law arising under the 2nd pillar 
(Common Foreign and Security Policy) or under the 3rd pillar (Police and Judicial Coopera-
tion in Penal Matters) will be referred to as ‘EU law’. Finally, the law arising under the 1st 
pillar is labelled ‘Community law’.
2  The Treaty of Accession usually contains a short main body and the Act of Accession with 
numerous Protocols and Annexes as its integral part. 
3  Article 11 (2) EU; ECJ Case C-105/03, Maria Pupino, [2005] ECR I-5285, Rec 42 of judg-
ment.  
4  The Commission’s opinion of 19 February 2003 on the application for accession to the 
European Union by the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, 
the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of 
Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic (OJ 2003, 
L 236, pp 3, 4, § 10); The Commission’s opinion of 22 February 2005 on the application 
for accession to the European Union by Bulgaria and Romania (OJ 2005, L 157, pp 3, 4, 
para 8).
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of Justice, according to which Community law enjoys supremacy over 
national law, including constitutional law.5 Accordingly, in the case of 
a confl ict, national administrations and courts are obliged to apply the 
relevant rule of Community law and not to apply the confl icting rule of 
national law6 or contracts concluded between social partners (Anwend-
ungsvorrang).7 
While the supremacy of Community law does not mean that con-
tradicting national law becomes invalid (Geltungsvorrang), this principle 
presents nevertheless a major challenge to national legal systems. From 
a domestic point of view, the constitution is the highest legal norm and 
other sources are subordinated to it. Hence, ways must be found to rec-
oncile obligations arising from Community law and the legal heritage of 
a country. As European law is integrated into the domestic law of a can-
didate country in ratifying the Treaty of Accession, two aspects thereof 
should be distinguished: the ratifi cation procedures and the following 
rank of Community law vis-à-vis national law. Next to such horizontal 
solutions, the constitutional legislator sometimes tackles specifi c policy 
fi elds where confl icts are likely to occur. This paper will review how the 
present Member States have accommodated the supremacy of Communi-
ty law over its domestic law in these three areas. In doing so, the practice 
of both the old and the new Member States is taken into account. Finally, 
a tentative conclusion from the Commission perspective is presented.  
Certainly, this is somewhat of a hazardous exercise, since much of 
the information gathered in this contribution summarises the experience 
in the Member States at second hand. Hence, this summary inevitably de-
rives from national reports8 and fi rst comparative works9 and may seem, 
5  ECJ Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125, 1135 para 3; ECJ 
Case 149/79 Commission vs. Belgium [1980] ECR 3881, 3903 para 19; ECJ Joined Cases 
97-99/87 Dow Chemical Ibérica and others vs. Commission [1989] ECR 3165 paras 37-38; 
ECJ Case 473/93, Commission v. Luxemburg [1996] ECR I-3207, 3258 paras 37-38.
6  ECJ Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1977] ECR 1978, 629 paras 21-24. 
7  ECJ Case C-184/89 Nimz [1991] I-321 para 20.
8  For national reports of the topic, see, inter alia, A Kellermann, J De Zwaan, J Czuczai 
(eds), EU Enlargement: The Constitutional Impact at EU and National Level (Asser Press, The 
Hague 2001); W Sadurski, J Ziller and K Zurek (eds), Après Enlargement, Legal and Politi-
cal Responses in Central and Eastern Europe (Florence EUI-RSCAS, 2006); A Kellermann, J 
Czuczai and others (eds), The Impact of EU Accession on the Legal Orders of the New Member 
States and (Pre-)Candidate Countries (Asser Press, The Hague 2006). 
9  J Dutheil de la Rochère, I Pernice, ‘General Report’ in International Federation of Euro-
pean Law, FIDE XX Congress London 2002, (British Institute of International and Compara-
tive Law 2003) 1-64; A Albi, EU Enlargement and the Constitutions of Central and Eastern 
Europe (Cambridge University Press 2005); A Albi, ‘“Europe” - Articles in the Constitutions 
of Central and Eastern Countries’ 42 CMLRev (2005) 399-423; A Albi ‘Supremacy of EC 
Law in the New Member States - Bringing Parliaments into the Equation of  “Co-operative 
Constitutionalism”’ 3 European Constitutional Law Review (2007) 25-67; J Czuczai, ‘Con-
stitutional Preparation for EU Accession in the New Central and Eastern European Member 
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given the need to respect space, somewhat superfi cial. Nevertheless, it 
is hoped that the disadvantages of this approach can be partly offset by 
providing an overall survey which includes the present 27 Member States 
and their relevant case law, as far as possible, up to 2006. 
II. Ratifi cation procedures
1. The founding Member States
When the founding States pooled some of their sovereign powers by 
creating the European Coal and Steel Community (1951), the Europe-
an Atomic Energy Community and the European Economic Community 
(1957), they relied on different constitutional provisions.10 The post-war 
constitutional law makers of Germany and Italy, facing the horrors of 
the fascist past, had put special emphasis on international cooperation. 
Hence, the Italian Constitution of 1947 contained a specifi c clause on 
the limitations of sovereignty,11 and the German Basic Law of 194912 al-
lowed for the transfer of powers to international organisations backing 
the ratifi cation of the EC founding treaties. The Netherlands introduced 
a constitutional amendment in 1953 to face ECSC membership.13 Under 
the new Article 67 (now Article 92), legislative, administrative and judicial 
powers could be transferred to international organisations. Moreover, in-
ternational treaties capable of binding citizens would prevail over earlier 
or later provisions of national law. Furthermore, unconstitutional trea-
ties could nevertheless be ratifi ed provided that a two-thirds majority in 
both houses of Parliament support the ratifi cation.14 In Luxemburg, a 
constitutional amendment of 195615 foresaw that the transfer of legisla-
States: Is the Rule of Law Better Than the Rule of Politics?’ in J de Zwaan, JH Jans and 
others (eds) The EU - An Ongoing Process of Integration: Liber Amicorum Afred E. Kellermann 
(Asser Press 2004) 269-283.
10  For an excellent overview, see B de Witte, ‘Constitutional Aspects of European Union 
Membership in the Original Six Member States: Model Solutions for the Applicant Coun-
tries?’ in A Kellermann, J De Zwaan, J Czuczai (eds), EU Enlargement (n 8) 65, 67-73.
11  Article 11 of the Italian Constitution stipulates: ‘Italy (…) agrees to the limitations of 
sovereignty necessary for an order that ensures peace and justice among Nations.’ 
12  Article 24 (1) of the Basic Law provides: ‘The Federation may transfer powers to interna-
tional bodies by law.’  As of the constitutional amendments of 1992, this article is no longer 
applicable for the transfer of powers to the EU (see below). 
13  J Peters, ‘The Dutch Constitution and Dutch Constitutional Values’ in Kellermann, de 
Zwaan, Czuczai (eds), EU Enlargement (n 8) 57, 58.
14  For more details, see HF Jonkheer, van Panhuys, ‘The Netherlands Constitution and 
International Law’ 47 AJIL (1953) 537-558. 
15  Article 49bis of the Luxemburg constitution, as revised by the amendment of 25 October 
1956, reads: ‘L’exercice d’attributions réservées par la constitution aux pouvoirs législatif, 
exécutif et judiciaire peut être temporairement dévolu par traité à des institutions de droit 
international.’
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tive, executive or judicial powers to international bodies could be effected 
by a two-thirds majority in Parliament.16 In France, limitations to sover-
eignty were already mentioned in recital 15 of the Preamble to the 1946 
Constitution, and international treaties were attributed supremacy over 
French domestic law under Article 55 of the 1958 Constitution.17 Belgium 
proceeded to a constitutional amendment in 1970 by introducing Article 
25 bis (today Article 3418) allowing the attribution of the exercise of pow-
ers to international bodies by law or by treaty. 
While the respective ratifi cation laws on the founding treaties only 
required a simple majority in Parliament (with the exception of Luxem-
bourg), the procedural requirements became more stringent when the old 
Member States faced the Maastricht Treaty. Germany adopted a whole 
new Article 23 in 1992 specifi cally dedicated to the transfer of powers to 
the European Union.19 European law touching on German constitutional 
law could from thereon only be accepted by a two-thirds majority in both 
German chambers, ie the quorum that would also be needed for consti-
tutional amendments. Also France reached the limits of passing simple 
ratifi cation laws with regard to the Maastricht Treaty 1991. According to 
Article 54 of the French Constitution,20 the Constitutional Council de-
livered an opinion pointing to the need to change the French Constitu-
16  Article 37 (2) in conjunction with Article 114 fi fth sentence of the Luxemburg Constitu-
tion.
17  The 1958 Constitution incorporates also by reference the Preamble of the 1946 Constitu-
tion, including its recital 15.
18  Article 34 of the Belgian Constitution reads: ‘The exercise of delimited powers can be 
attributed by treaty or by law to the institutions of public law’.
19  Article 23 (1) of the Basic Law reads: ‘(1) For the realisation of a unifi ed Europe, the 
Federal Republic of Germany participates in the development of the European Union which 
respects democracy, rule of law, social and federal principles and the principle of subsidi-
arity and which ensures a level of human rights protection that is comparable to the one 
afforded by the Basic Law. The Federation may transfer to this end powers by law with the 
assent of the Bundesrat. For the establishment of the European Union as well as modifi ca-
tions of its legal bases through which the Basic Law is changed or amended in its contents, 
Article 79 (2) and (3) are applicable.’
Hence, a transfer of power to the EU needs a simple majority in the Bundestag (House of 
Representatives ) plus assent in the Bundesrat (Federal Chamber) - Article 23 (1) 2 GG. If 
the transfer of powers entails a constitutional modifi cation in Germany, the ratifi cation law 
must be adopted by a two-thirds majority in both chambers - Article 23 (1) 3 GG in conjunc-
tion with Article 79 GG.
20  Article 54 of the French Constitution says:
‘Si le Conseil Constitutionnel, saisi par le Président de la République, par le Premier Mi-
nistre, par le Président de l’une ou l’autre assemblée ou par soixante députés ou soixante 
sénateurs, a déclaré qu’un engagement international comporte une clause contraire à la 
constitution, l’autorisation de ratifi er ou d’approuver l’engagement international en cause 
ne peut intervenir qu’après révision de la constitution.’
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tion on some points21 prior to the ratifi cation of the Maastricht treaty.22 
Indeed, a new title dedicated to EU matters was inserted after the tough 
procedure of gaining a three-fi fths majority in ‘congress’, ie the common 
meeting of the Senate and House of Deputies under Article 89 (3) of the 
French Constitution. One of the amendments led to a new ‘Europe Arti-
cle’ in Article 88 (1) of the constitution.23 
2. The United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark 
In 1972, the United Kingdom House of Commons adopted the Euro-
pean Communities Act for the ratifi cation of its Accession Treaty by sim-
ple majority. In Denmark, Paragraph 20 (2) of the Constitution allows for 
the delegation of powers to international authorities by statute adopted 
by a fi ve-sixths parliamentary majority or a simple majority in a popular 
vote if the former is not reached.24 Following an agreement of the Dan-
ish political parties to submit the treaty to the people without prior vote 
in Parliament, the referendum of 2 October 1972 found 57% of Danes 
voting in favour. Ireland proceeded to a constitutional amendment by 
referendum. The people voted for a provision according to which Ireland 
could accede to the Communities.25 Following the Crotty decision of the 
Supreme Court relating to the Single European Act,26 this procedure has 
to be repeated in Ireland each time the Treaties touch upon Irish consti-
tutional law. It follows therefrom that the Irish Constitution contains a 
chronology of the constitutional developments in the Community.27 
21  For more details, see below Section IV.
22  Conseil Constitutionel, Décision no 92-308, = RFDC 1992, 334. See B Genevois, ‘Le 
Traité sur l’Union Européenne et la Constitution’, 8 RFDA (1992) 373ff; Ch. Walter, ‘Die 
drei Entscheidungen des französischen Verfassungsrats zum Vertrag von Maastricht über 
die Europäische Union’, 19 EuGRZ (1993) 183ff; P Oliver, ‘The French Constitution and the 
Treaty of Maastricht’, 43 ICLQ (1994) 1.
23  Article 88-1 of the French Constitution reads: ‘La République participe aux Communau-
tés européennes et à l’Union européenne, constituées d’Etats qui ont choisi librement, en 
vertu des traités qui les ont instituées, d’exercer en commun certaines de leurs compéten-
ces.’
24  § 20 of the Danish Constitution provides (translation by the author): ‘(1) Powers which 
belong to the authorities of the King under this constitution may be transferred by law to a 
certain degree to international bodies which are established by international agreement to 
promote the international rule of law and cooperation. (2) Draft laws must be adopted by 
fi ve-sixths of the Members of the Folketing. If such a majority is not achieved, but only a 
simple majority, the Government may submit the draft law to the people for a referendum 
according to the provisions in § 42.’
25  Article 29 (4) (3) of the Irish Constitution reads: ‘The State may become a member of the 
European Coal and Steel Community (…), the European Economic Community (…) and the 
European Atomic Energy Community.’
26  Crotty v. An Taoiseach [1987] IR 713.
27  Article 29 (4)-(7) contains references to all the subsequent Treaty changes in the Com-
munity (Single European Act, Treaty of Maastricht, Treaty of Amsterdam, Treaty of Nice). 
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3. Greece, Portugal and Spain
In Greece, the Constitution allows for the transfer of powers to in-
ternational bodies with a majority of three-fi fths in Parliament, whereas 
limitations of sovereignty can already be passed with an absolute major-
ity.28 Legal scholars did not agree whether ratifi cation of the EC treaty 
would fall under the fi rst or second category, or under both.29 However, 
this dispute did not play a role in practice, since the large majority in the 
Greek Parliament voting in favour of accession on 28 June 1979 easily 
met the three-fi fths threshold. According to Articles 93 of the Spanish 
constitution, the exercise of State functions can be transferred by way 
of an organic law.30 Accordingly, the Spanish ratifi cation law of 2 Au-
gust 1985 had to gain at least an absolute majority in both chambers of 
Parliament. In contrast, Article 161 (i) of the Portuguese Constitution of 
1976 required only a simple majority in Parliament for the Portuguese 
ratifi cation law.31 Portugal changed this approach when it inserted a gen-
eral clause into its Constitution allowing for the common exercise of pow-
ers in the EU32 prior to the ratifi cation of the Maastricht Treaty.33
For more details, see G Hogan, ‘Ireland and the European Union: Constitutional Law and 
Practice’ in Kellermann, De Zwaan and Czuczai (eds), EU Enlargement (n 8) 89, 91-93.
28  Article 28 of the Greek Constitution stipulates: ‘(2) Authorities provided by the constitu-
tion may by treaty or agreement be vested in agencies of international organisations, when 
this serves an important national interest and promotes cooperation with other States. A 
majority of three-fi fths of the total number of Members of Parliament shall be necessary 
to vote the law sanctioning the treaty or agreement. (3) Greece shall freely proceed by law 
passed by an absolute majority of the total number of Members of Parliament to limit the 
exercise of national sovereignty, insofar as this is dictated by an important national interest, 
does not infringe upon the rights of man and foundations of democratic government and is 
effected on the basis of the principles of equality and under the conditions of reciprocity.’
29  K Chryssogonos, ‘The European Union and the Greek Constitutional Order’ in Keller-
mann, De Zwaan and Czuczai (eds.), EU Enlargement (n 8) 141, 142.
30  Article 93 of the Spanish Constitution reads: ‘Mediante la ley orgánica se podrá la cel-
ebración de tratados por los que se atribuya a una organización o institución el ejercicio 
de competencias derivadas de la Constitución. Corresponde a las Cortes General o al Gobi-
erno, según los casos, la garantia del cumplimiento de estos tratados y de las resoluciones 
emanadas de los organismos internacionales o supranacionales titulares de la cesión.’
31  Article 161 i) of the Portuguese Constitution provides: ‘The Assembly of the Republic has 
the following powers: i) To approve international conventions, specifi cally treaties for the 
membership of Portugal in international organisations, treaties of friendship, of peace, for 
defence or to rectify boundaries, or concerning military matters (…).’
32  Article 7 VI of the Portuguese Constitution, as amended in 1992, stipulates: ‘Provided 
that there is reciprocity, Portugal may enter into agreements for the joint exercise of the 
powers necessary to establish the European Union, in ways that have due regard for the 
principle of subsidiarity and the objective of economic and social cohesion.’
33  R. M. Moura Ramos, ‘The adaptation of the Portuguese Constitutional Order to Commu-
nity Law’ in Kellermann, De Zwaan and Czuczai (eds), EU Enlargement (n 8) 131, 133. 
66 Frank Hoffmeister: Constitutional Implications of EU Membership: A View from the Commission
4. Austria, Finland and Sweden
All three acceding countries of 1995 put the decision on EU acces-
sion to popular vote, although this was not constitutionally obligatory.34 
Austria decided to proceed to a total revision of the Constitution because 
EU accession was regarded to touch upon a number of fundamental con-
stitutional principles, such as democracy, the rule of law and the separa-
tion of powers.35 This revision required the participation of the people and 
a two-thirds majority in both chambers of Parliament under Article 44 (3) 
of the Constitution.36 Only after the positive vote of the Austrian people did 
the Parliament enact the Constitutional Act on Austria’s Accession and 
the Austrian President signed the Accession Treaty. A consultative refer-
endum prior to the adoption of a parliamentary ratifi cation bill occurred 
in Sweden. That Act was then passed on the basis of a constitutional 
amendment allowing the transfer of powers to the European Communi-
ties and calling for a three-fourths majority in the Swedish Parliament 
or for the procedure applying to basic laws.37 Finland held a consultative 
referendum before acceding to the European Union. Following its dual-
ist tradition, accession entailed two steps:38 the House could vote with a 
simple majority on the international ratifi cation of the Accession Treaty; 
however, as the substance of the Treaty was considered to be unconsti-
tutional, the Finnish EU Accession Act required a two-thirds majority 
34  F. Granell, ‘Les conditions d’adhésion de l’Autriche, de la Finlande, de la Norvège et de la 
Suède à l’Union Européenne’, Revue du Marché Commun (1994) 583-591.
35  S. Griller, ‘Introduction to the Problems in the Austrian, the Finnish and Swedish Con-
stitutional Order’ in Kellermann, De Zwaan and Czuczai (eds), EU Enlargement (n 8) 147, 
148. 
36  Article 44 (3) of the Austrian Constitution reads: ‘Jede Gesamtänderung der Bundesver-
fassung, eine Teiländerung aber nur, wenn dies von einem Drittel der Mitglieder des Natio-
nalrates oder des Bundesrates verlangt wird, ist nach Beendigung des Verfahrens gemäß 
Artikel 42, jedoch vor der Beurkundung durch den Bundespräsidenten, einer Abstimmung 
des gesamten Bundesvolkes zu unterziehen.’ For more details on the Austrian approach, 
see T Oehlinger, Verfassungsfragen einer Mitgliedschaft zur Europaeischen Union (1999) 
with annotation by F Hoffmeister, Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt (2000) 1296. 
37  Chapter 10, Article 5 of the Swedish Constitution reads: ‘The Riksdag may entrust the 
right of decision-making to the European communities so long as these provide protection 
for rights and freedoms corresponding to the protection provided under this Instrument of 
Government and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms. The Riksdag authorises such delegation in a decision which has the sup-
port of at least three-fourths of those present and voting. The Riksdag may also take such a 
decision in the manner prescribed for the adoption of a fundamental law.’
In practice, the Swedish Parliament decided to use the second option (procedure for the 
adoption of a fundamental law). Hence, the bill on the Act of Accession was voted by Parlia-
ment; then Parliament was dissolved, and the newly elected Parliament confi rmed the bill. 
With the consensus of two differently composed Parliaments, the bill entered into force.
38  A Rosas, ‘Finland’s accession to the European Union: Constitutional Aspects’ 1 Euro-
pean Public Law (1995) 166-170.
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under the standing orders of Parliament. The new Finnish Constitution of 
2000 subsequently harmonised the external and the internal procedure. 
Under a new provision, international treaties with constitutional impact 
henceforth need parliamentary ratifi cation with a two-thirds majority.39
5. The twelve new Member States
a) Malta and Cyprus
In Malta, section 6 of the Constitution provides for its supremacy 
over any other law, which to the extent of the inconsistency shall be void. 
In 1990, a government report advised amending this section so that the 
Constitution would also become subject to Community law. However, 
such an amendment would require a two-thirds majority in Parliament 
under Article 66 (2) (b) of the Constitution. As such a majority was un-
likely to occur given the fi rm opposition of the main opposition party to 
EU accession, the report went on to argue that short of an amendment 
to section 6, a declaration that Community law prevails over Maltese 
law should be inserted in an ordinary Act of Parliament.40 As the bipolar 
political situation in Malta continued to exist during the course of acces-
sion, the accommodation of EU membership actually followed this line of 
thinking in 2003. The government submitted to the people the question 
whether Malta should become a member of the European Union. In the 
referendum of 8 March 2003, over 90% of Maltese voters participated and 
a majority of 53.65% voted in favour. From a constitutional point of view, 
this vote was only consultative. Two months after signing the Accession 
Treaty, on 16 July 2003, the Maltese Parliament adopted the European 
Union Act (with 34 votes in favour and 25 against).41 That Act could not 
modify Section 6 of the Constitution (protected by a two-thirds threshold 
under Section 66), but revised Section 65 of the Constitution42 which 
39  Article 94 (2) of the Finnish Constitution of 11 June 1999 (entered into force 2000) reads: 
‘A decision concerning the acceptance of an international obligation or the denouncement of 
it is made by a majority of the votes cast. However, if the proposal concerns the constitution 
or an alteration of the national borders, the decision shall be made by at least two-thirds 
of the votes cast.’
40  Report from the EC Directorate to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Department of Information, March 1990, quoted by P. G. Xuereb, ‘Constitutional Ques-
tions Raised by the Proposed Accession of Malta to the European Union’ in Kellermann, De 
Zwaan and Czuczai, EU Enlargement (n 8) 229, 230-231.
41  Act V of 2003 - European Union Act (Chapter 460) of 16 July 2003. Section 6 says: ‘For 
the purposes of the ratifi cation of Treaties Act the Government of Malta is hereby author-
ised to ratify the (Accession) Treaty.’
42  Section 7 of the European Union Act provides: ‘For subarticle (1) of article 65 of the con-
stitution, there shall be substituted the following: (1) Subject to the provisions of this con-
stitution, Parliament may make laws of the peace, order and good government of Malta in 
conformity with full respect for human rights, generally accepted principles of international 
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concerned the law-making powers of the House and was not protected by 
Article 66.43  
In the Republic of Cyprus, the rigid Constitution of 1960 is the su-
preme law of the land, as expressly stated in Article 179. Furthermore, 
several Articles on the powers of State institutions were identifi ed as being 
potentially incompatible with EU membership.44 Following this analysis, 
the Attorney-General Markides serving under President Clerides, sup-
ported by some doctrine in Cyprus, took the view that a modifi cation of 
the Constitution prior to EU accession was desirable in May 2002.45 Ideas 
about a consultative referendum that would conform with the sovereign 
right of the people to choose their own form of government and to deter-
mine relations with other nations were also fl oated.46 However, against 
the background of ongoing talks between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish 
Cypriot leaders on a settlement of the political problem and UN mediation 
on the issue, the government under President Papadopoulos (in offi ce 
since spring 2003) did not put a constitutional amendment to the Parlia-
ment following an opinion of the new Attorney-General to the effect that 
no amendment of the Constitution was needed prior to the ratifi cation of 
the Treaty.47 Accordingly, the House merely approved an act of ratifi ca-
tion to the Accession Treaty on 14 July 2003 under Article 169 of the 
Constitution and no EU accession referendum was held. A constitutional 
amendment with a majority of (presently only Greek Cypriot) Members of 
the House was, however, passed after Cyprus had already become an EU 
Member State in 2006.48
b) Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia
In the Baltic States, any constitutional amendment on articles on 
sovereignty and independence necessitates a referendum. This is why 
the process of amendment in these countries has been most diffi cult and 
law and Malta’s international and regional obligations, in particular those assumed by the 
treaty of accession to the European Union, signed in Athens on the 16th of April 2003.’
43  For a discussion whether or not an amendment to Section 65 of the Maltese Government 
was necessary, see PG Xuereb, ‘Constitutional Questions Raised by the Proposed Accession 
of Malta to the European Union’ in Kellermann, De Zwaan and Czuczai (eds), EU Enlarge-
ment (n 8) 229, 233.
44  N Emiliou, ‘The Constitutional Impact of Enlargement at EU and National Level: the 
Case of the Republic of Cyprus’ in Kellermann, De Zwaan and Czuczai (eds), EU Enlarge-
ment (n 8) 243, 249-250.
45  F Hoffmeister, Legal Aspects of the Cyprus Problem - Annan Plan and EU Accession (Brill 
2006) 205 with further references.
46  Emiliou  (n 44) 251.
47  N Emiliou, ‘Cyprus’ in Kellermann, Czuczai and others (eds), Impact of EU Accession (n 
8) 303, 307.
48  See below Section III 1.
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controversial.49 Indeed, no such amendment occurred in Lithuania prior 
to accession50 despite numerous recommendations to insert a transfer of 
power clause.51 Accordingly, Article 136 of the Lithuanian Constitution 
remained sedes materiae in the pre-accession period. It provides that 
Lithuania shall participate in international organisations provided that 
they do no contradict the interests and the independence of the State. 
The article is silent on any special procedures related to such participa-
tion. Rather, under Article 9 (1) of the constitution, the most signifi cant 
issues concerning the life of the State and the people shall be decided by 
referendum. From 10 to 11 May 2003, the population was asked to mark 
its approval or disapproval of the statement: ‘I am for Lithuania’s mem-
bership of the European Union.’ In a turnout of 63.3%, a high percent-
age of 91.04% of voters voted in the affi rmative. The law of ratifi cation to 
the Accession Treaty was adopted in Parliament under Article 84 point 
11 of the Constitution on 16 September 2003 with 84 out of 87 votes in 
favour. However, ex post factum, the Parliament adopted on 13 July 2004 
a separate Constitutional Act pursuant to Article 148 of the Constitution 
in two separate votes. According to Article 1 of this Act, Lithuania shares 
with or entrusts to the European Union competencies of its State institu-
tions in the spheres provided for in the founding treaties of the European 
Union.52 
In Latvia, EU accession led to some changes to the Constitution on 8 
May 2003. Whereas Articles 1 and 2 on independence and sovereignty re-
mained unchanged,53 a new Article 68 allows for the delegation of a part 
of State powers to international institutions. Such delegation may be rati-
fi ed by the Saeima (Parliament) by a two-thirds majority. In the case of 
membership in the European Union, an additional national referendum 
is necessary, although with a reduced turnout (Article 79). Rather than 
the 50% threshold for constitutional amendment referendums, only half 
of the turnout rate of the previous parliamentary elections was needed for 
49  Albi, EU Enlargement and the Constitutions of Central and Eastern Europe (n 9) 87.
50  On Lithuanian amendments related to specifi c EU related matters, see below Part IV.
51  Albi, EU Enlargement and the Constitutions of Central and Eastern Europe, (n 9)  98-103. 
The proposal of the European Law Department of the Government of Lithuania are reprint-
ed in V Vadapalas, ‘Lithuania: The Constitutional Impact of the Enlargement at National 
Level’ in Kellermann, De Zwaan and Czuczai (eds), EU Enlargement (n 8) 347, 366-368. 
52  Article 1 of the Constitutional Act reads: ‘The Republic of Lithuania as a Member State 
of the European Union shall share with or entrust to the European Union competencies of 
its State institutions in the spheres provided for in the founding Treaties of the European 
Union and to the extent that, together with the other Member States of the European Un-
ion, it could jointly meet its commitments in those spheres and could also enjoy the rights 
accorded by membership.’
53  For a discussion whether or not amendments to these articles were necessary, see A 
Usacka, ‘The Impact of the European Integration Process on the Constitution of Latvia’ in 
Kellermann, De Zwaan and Czuczai (eds), EU Enlargement (n 8) 337, 340-341.
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the accession referendum. On 20 September 2003, a majority of 67.44% 
of the voters participating in the polls (72.53 %) voted in favour of EU 
accession. The Latvian Parliament ratifi ed the Accession Treaty on 2 Oc-
tober 2003 with a large majority (out of 95 votes cast, 91 were in favour 
and 4 against). 
Finally, Estonia underwent a rather special procedure. Under Article 
1 of the Constitution, Estonian independence and sovereignty are ‘inter-
minable and inalienable’. A government commission came to the conclu-
sion to amend this article and to insert a new delegation of power clause 
to allow for EU membership.54 However, under Chapter XV of the Con-
stitution, a referendum would have been obligatory for amending provi-
sions in Chapter I, including those on sovereignty and independence; 
‘ordinary’ amendments relating to provisions in other Chapters would 
have to be supported by a majority of all deputies and by the succeeding 
Parliament with a three-fi fths majority. Given the procedural constraints 
involved, it was decided after heated political discussions not to formally 
touch the text of the Constitution itself. Rather, on 18 December 2002, 
the Riigikogu (Parliament) adopted the Third Constitutional Act to sup-
plement the Constitution. Under Articles 1 and 2 of this Act, Estonia 
belongs to the European Union and applies its constitution, taking into 
account the rights and obligations deriving from the Accession Treaty. 
Article 3 contained the following question: ‘Are you in favour of the ac-
cession to the European Union and passage of the Act on Amendments 
to the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia?’ In the referendum of 14 
September 2003, 64.06% of Estonian voters participated. A majority of 
66.8% voted in favour of the constitutional amendment and at the same 
time for accession.55 This paved the way for the unanimous ratifi cation of 
the Accession Treaty by Estonia by the Parliament on 21 January 2004, 
after the National Court had declared nine cases against the referendum 
to be inadmissible on procedural grounds.56
54  T Kerimäe, ‘Estonian Constitutional Problems in Accession to the EU’ in Kellermann, De 
Zwaan and Czuczai (eds), EU Enlargement (n 8) 291, 295-297.
55  Albi, EU Enlargement and the Constitutions of Central and Eastern Europe (n 9) 90.
56  Albi, EU Enlargement and the Constitutions of Central and Eastern Europe (n 9) 92 with 
further references.
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c) Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia
Article 90 of the Polish Constitution of 199757 entails a choice for the 
legislature. The delegation of powers could either be adopted in Parlia-
ment, requiring a two-thirds majority in both chambers (Sejm and Sen-
ate), or consent for ratifi cation could be given by a nationwide referen-
dum. On 17 April 2003, the Sejm decided for the latter option.58 Accord-
ing to the referendum law of 14 March 2003,59 a turnout of at least 50% 
was needed for a binding vote. In the referendum of 7-8 June, 58.85% of 
voters cast their vote, and a majority of 77.45% voted for EU accession. 
Poland deposited its ratifi cation act to the Accession Treaty on 5 August 
2003. 
In Slovakia, a comprehensive constitutional reform with altogether 
85 amendments was adopted by Parliament in February 2001.60 Rather 
than resorting to the old Article 7 on ‘union with other states’,61 the new 
Article 7 (2) allows for the transfer of the exercise of competences to the 
European Union.62 Such a transfer requires a three-fi fths majority in Par-
liament (Article 84 (4)). In addition, referendums can be held on ‘impor-
tant issues of public interest’ or on joining ‘state alliances’ (Article 93 (2) 
and (1)). While the latter provision envisaged potential decisions over a 
closer relationship with the Czech Republic, the former was used prior to 
EU accession. On 16-17 May 2003 the people were asked whether they 
would agree with Slovak EU membership. The slim passing of the 50% 
57  Article 90 of the Polish Constitution reads: ‘(1) The Republic of Poland may, by virtue of 
international agreements, delegate to an international organisation or international institu-
tion the competence of organs of State authority in relation to certain matters. (2) A statute, 
granting consent for ratifi cation of an international agreement referred to in para. 1, shall 
be passed by the Seim by a two-thirds majority in the presence of at least half of the statu-
tory number of Deputies, and by the Senate by a two-thirds majority in the presence of at 
least half of the statutory numbers of Senators. (3) Granting of consent for ratifi cation of 
such agreement may also be passed by a nationwide referendum in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 125. (4) Any resolution in respect of the choice of procedure for granting 
consent to ratifi cation shall be taken by the Sejm by an absolute majority vote taken in the 
presence of at least half of the statutory number of Deputies.’
58  Uchwala Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 17 kwietnia 2003 r. Dz.U. Nr. 66 pz. 
613 (2003).
59  Ustawa z dnie 14 marca 2003 r. Dz.U. Nr. 57, pz. 507 (2003).
60  Constitutional Act No 460/1992. For details, see Albi, EU Enlargement and the Constitu-
tions of Central and Eastern Europe (n 9) 67-70.
61  In Slovakia there was considerable debate whether it would be appropriate to resort to 
that Article. See V Kunová, ‘Constitutional Aspects of the Accession of the Slovak Republic 
to the European Union’ in Kellermann, De Zwaan and Czuczai (eds), EU Enlargement (n 8) 
327, 328.
62  Article 7 (2) of the Slovak Constitution stipulates: ‘The Slovak Republic may, by an in-
ternational treaty, which was ratifi ed and promulgated in the way laid down by law, or on 
the basis of such treaty, transfer the exercise of a part of its powers to the European Com-
munities and the European Union. (…).’
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threshold (52.15% turnout) was - politically - compensated by the high 
number of positive votes (93.71%). Against the background of this popu-
lar support, the Slovak Parliament adopted on 1 July 2003 the Act of 
Ratifi cation to the Accession Treaty with 129 votes in favour out of 140. 
In the Czech Republic, the government proposed several times to 
Parliament to modify the national Constitution in view of EU accession. 
A modest amendment was fi nally adopted in the House of Representa-
tives (July 2001) and the Senate (October 2001) and entered into force 
on 1 June 2002.63 According to the new Article 10a,64 a treaty delegating 
powers to international institutions must either be ratifi ed by a majority 
of three-fi fths in both houses of Parliament or by a referendum. A total 
of 55.18% of the population went to the polls on 13-14 June 2003, and 
there was a majority of 77.33% voting in favour of EU accession. Against 
that background, the Czech president signed the ratifi cation bill into law 
on 30 September 2003. 
In Hungary, where a two-thirds majority in Parliament is needed to 
change the constitution, the four parliamentary groups agreed on a con-
stitutional modifi cation in December 2002.65 Article 2A on joint exercise 
of powers in the European Union66 necessitates a two-thirds majority in 
Parliament for the ratifi cation of the Accession Treaty. In addition, the 
need to hold a national referendum on EU accession was specifi cally laid 
down in Article 79 of the Constitution.67 In the popular vote of 12 April 
63  Constitutional Act No 395/2001 Coll. 
64  Article 10a of the Czech Constitution reads: ‘(1) Certain powers of constitutional insti-
tutions can be transferred by an international treaty to an international organization or 
institution. (2) Such a treaty must be ratifi ed by both chambers of the Parliament unless a 
constitutional act requires that such ratifi cation needs the approval by referendum.’
Article 39 (4) reads: ‘For the adoption of a constitutional act or the ratifi cation of an inter-
national treaty referred to in Article 10a, a 3/5 majority of all deputies and a 3/5 majority 
of present Senators is required.’
65  Act No LXI/2002. For more details on the Hungarian reform, see J Czuczai, ‘Constitu-
tional Preparation for EU Accession’ (n 9) 278-283.
66  Article 2 A of the Hungarian Constitution reads: ‘(1) By virtue of a treaty, the Republic 
of Hungary, in its capacity as a Member State of the European Union, may exercise con-
stitutional powers jointly with other Member States to the extent necessary in connection 
with the rights and obligations conferred by the treaties on the foundation of the European 
Union and the European Communities (hereinafter referred to as “European Union”); these 
powers may be exercised independently and by way of the institutions of the European Un-
ion. (2) The ratifi cation and promulgation of the treaty referred to in Subsection (1) shall be 
subject to a two-thirds majority vote of the Parliament.’
67  Article 79 of the Hungarian Constitution reads: ‘A peremptory national referendum shall 
be held concerning the accession of the Republic of Hungary to the European Union under 
the conditions laid down in the accession treaty. The date of this referendum will be 12 April 
2003. The question of the referendum shall read as follows: “Do you agree that the Republic 
of Hungary should become a member of the European Union?”’
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2003,68 the turnout of 45.59 % was the lowest in all the new Member 
States. However, as no threshold existed, a majority of 83.76% of votes in 
favour created the legal prerequisite for an act of ratifi cation. The Hun-
garian Parliament actually ratifi ed the Accession Treaty unanimously on 
17 December 2003.69 
On 7 March 2003, the Slovenian Parliament amended the national 
constitution, easily reaching the necessary two-thirds majority as re-
quired by Articles 168-171 of the Slovenian constitution. It inserted with 
Article 3a of the constitution70 a clause on the transfer of the exercise of 
part of its sovereign rights to international organisations. A ratifi cation 
law must be adopted by a two-thirds majority in Parliament. In addition, 
Parliament may call a referendum before ratifying the agreement. Indeed, 
the Slovene people were invited to vote on 23 March 2003, and 60.23% 
cast their vote. In total, 89.61% voted for EU accession. The parliamen-
tary ratifi cation bill on the Accession Treaty was passed with 80 votes out 
of 84 on 28 January 2004. 
d) Bulgaria and Romania
Both Bulgaria and Romania underwent ‘remarkably comprehen-
sive’71 constitutional reforms prior to their EU accession. 
A constitutional amendment of 18 February 2005 introduced a 
number of innovations into the Bulgarian Constitution of 1991. A new 
Article 4 (3) stipulates that the Republic of Bulgaria shall participate in 
the construction and development of the European Union. The new Arti-
cle 85 (1) point 9 empowers the National Assembly to ratify international 
68  Note that the date of 12 April 2003 was deliberately chosen to be prior to the signing 
of the Accession Treaty. The Hungarian Government advocated this sequence of events to 
have the full backing of the Hungarian people before proceeding to sign, instead of run-
ning the risk of signing followed by a possibly negative referendum result which would 
seriously damage the government’s credibility. See the speech of Foreign Minister Kovacs 
before the Hungarian Parliament on 15 November 2002 <www.parlament.hu/biz/europa/
angol/menu/index_1.htm>.
69  Parliamentary Resolution No 133/2003 (XII.17).
70  Article 3a of the Slovenian Constitution reads: ‘(1) Pursuant to a treaty ratifi ed by the 
National Assembly by a two-thirds majority vote of all deputies, Slovenia may transfer the 
exercise of part of its sovereign rights to international organisations which are based on 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy and the principles of the 
rule of law and may enter into a defensive alliance with states which are based on respect 
for such values. (2) Before ratifying an international treaty referred to in the preceding 
paragraph, the National Assembly may call a referendum. A proposal shall pass at the refer-
endum if a majority of voters who have cast valid votes vote in favour of such. The National 
Assembly is bound by the result of such referendum. If such referendum has been held, a 
referendum regarding the law on the ratifi cation of the treaty concerned may not be called. 
(3) …(4) …’
71  A Albi, ‘Impact of European Integration on National Constitutions and Parliaments’ in 
Kellermann, Czuczai and others (eds), Impact of EU Accession (n 8) 243, 265.
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treaties which confer to the European Union powers ensuing from the 
Constitution with a two-thirds majority of all Members of Parliament. As 
these amendments did not fall within the reserved powers of the Grand 
National Assembly (a specifi cally convened body to decide upon funda-
mental constitutional changes),72 the ordinary National Assembly decided 
on them with a three-quarters majority (Article 155 of the Constitution). 
Based on these new constitutional provisions, the Accession Treaty of 25 
April 2005 was ratifi ed by the Bulgarian Parliament on 11 May 2005 with 
an overwhelming majority of 231 out of 234 Members of Parliament. 
In Romania, the starting point was different. Under Article 147 (3) of 
the Constitution, any revision needs to be approved by a national refer-
endum. Furthermore, by virtue of Article 152, no constitutional amend-
ment may touch upon the national, independent, unitary, and indivisible 
character of the Romanian State; the Republican form of government; 
territorial integrity; independence of the judiciary; political pluralism and 
the offi cial language. Against this background, the Romanian Constitu-
tional Court was asked whether a legislative proposal for an amendment 
to the Constitution could foresee the transfer of powers to the European 
Union. In Decision No 148 of 16 April 2003, the Court confi rmed the con-
stitutionality of the proposal by arguing, inter alia, that the sharing of the 
exercise of sovereign attributes with other states does not confer on the 
EU ‘competence over competence’, ie its own sovereignty. Furthermore, 
the concept of national sovereignty could no longer be conceived as abso-
lute and indivisible, ‘without taking the risk of acknowledging an unac-
ceptably isolated position’.73  After the Court had thus paved the way, the 
amendments were put to the people in October 2003. With a participa-
tion level of 54%, over 80% of voters agreed, along with another thirty or 
more amendments, to anchor a new title VI into the Romanian Constitu-
tion entitled ‘Euro-Atlantic integration’. The new Article 148 (1)74 provides 
that Romania’s EU accession can be passed by a two-thirds majority in 
both Houses of Parliament. In fact, both the Chamber of Deputies and 
the Senate adopted unanimously the ratifi cation bill for the Accession 
Treaty on 18 May 2005, with all 434 parliamentarians voting in favour. 
72  Decision of the Bulgarian Constitutional Court, 10 April 2003, reported in E Tanchev, 
‘Constitutional Amendments Due to Bulgarian Full EU Membership’ in Kellermann, De 
Zwaan, Czuczai (eds), EU Enlargement (n 8) 308.
73  Constitutional Court of Romania, Decision No 148, OJ 171, Part I, No 317, cited in V 
Dudulescu, R Adam, ‘Romania’ in Kellermann, Czuczai and others (eds), Impact of EU Ac-
cession (n 8) 113, 119, n 10. 
74  Article 148 of the Romanian Constitution reads: ‘Romania’s accession to the constituent 
treaties of the European Union, with a view of transferring certain powers to Community 
institutions, as well as to exercising in common with other Member States the abilities 
stipulated in such treaties, shall be carried out by means of a law adopted in the joint sitting 
of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, with a majority of two thirds of the number of 
deputies and senators.’
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6. Analytical comparison
For the purpose of this rough overview, we may briefl y compare the 
main theoretical differences relating to the ratifi cation procedures of the 
now 27 Member States and their practical impact.
a) Theoretical models
A few States apply their constitutional provisions as regards the rati-
fi cation of international treaties irrespective of the special nature of the 
European Union. However, in these States the parliamentary act of rati-
fi cation takes account of the need to ensure primacy of Community law, 
as is the case in the United Kingdom and Malta. In Finland, the absence 
of a specifi c constitutional basis for EU membership is compensated by 
the fact that a constitutional majority was needed to adopt the Accession 
Act. In Lithuania and Cyprus, the special constitutional signifi cance of 
EU membership was recognised shortly after accession by the passage 
of specifi c EU integration clauses. While reasons for such delay are un-
clear in Lithuania,75 in Cyprus the special circumstances of parallel EU 
accession and UN mediation on the Cyprus problem provided a unique 
context.
In another group of States, the predominant idea is the limitation 
of sovereignty. In the old Member States, such language was originally 
present in the Constitutions of France and Italy. It also found its way into 
the Greek Constitution, which, however, also at the same time embod-
ies the concept of transfer of powers. On the one hand, this construction 
appears to reconcile easily with other constitutional provisions on sover-
eignty. When sovereignty is only limited, then there can be no doubt that 
it is still vested in the people as the souverain. Accordingly, any allegation 
that EU membership would undermine the sovereignty of the State can 
easily be discarded under such a model, and EU membership becomes 
possible without prior constitutional amendments on sovereignty.76 On 
the other hand, this concept is not particularly in fashion any more. In 
France, a new clause on joint exercise of powers was added in 1992, but 
this model cannot be found in any of the new Member States.
Another idea is contained in the expression transfer of powers, as 
used in the old Member States of Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, 
and Sweden. Here, the constitutional legislator makes the point that cer-
tain powers are no longer vested in the State institutions. Rather, they 
are transferred to an international organisation or the European Union. 
75  I Jarukaitis, ‘Lithuania’ in Kellermann, Czuczai and others (eds), Impact of EU Accession 
(n 8) 385, 395.
76  De Witte (n 10) 68.
76 Frank Hoffmeister: Constitutional Implications of EU Membership: A View from the Commission
These entities then enjoy constitutional legitimacy by the very fact that 
their powers were attributed through a special procedure. While not being 
explicit, the notion of transfer of power may also imply that the respec-
tive power is waived at national level.77 In Denmark and Sweden, the act 
is described as delegation which entails the legal connotation of transfer 
from a superior to an inferior level.78 Among the new Member States, 
Latvia, Poland, the Czech Republic all joined this group with a preference 
for using the term delegation rather than transfer of powers; in contrast, 
Bulgaria is closer to the German and Dutch terminology. 
A fourth group of States speaks of common exercise of powers. Such 
wording is common in the old Member States of Luxemburg, Belgium, 
Spain, Portugal, and France (since 1992). Under this model, the power re-
mains in the State institution, but may also be exercised by another level 
of governance. The State therefore still enjoys the constitutional power to 
adopt national measures in relevant policy areas of the European Union, 
but has agreed that such measures need to be compatible with the law of 
the latter. An exercise of powers clause can also be interpreted as requir-
ing the supremacy of Community law to have its limits in the basic prin-
ciples and values of the Constitution, as did the Spanish Constitutional 
Court in its Opinion on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 
with respect to the Spanish clause.79 
This model has also attracted the new Member States of Slovakia 
and Slovenia. Moreover, in Hungary, the Parliament deliberately modi-
fi ed the wording ‘delegation of powers’ used in the government bill, which 
was perceived by the opposition parties as being too far reaching, into 
‘jointly exercise certain powers with other Member States’.80 This Hun-
garian clause also uses the remarkable limitation that such joint exercise 
is only desired ‘to the extent necessary’ for compliance with European 
law. Romania is another interesting example, where both the transfer of 
powers to Community institutions and the common exercise of powers 
are mentioned in the same provision.
Finally, certain States directly combined EU accession with con-
stitutional modifi cations. This technique was witnessed fi rst in Ireland. 
77  J Zemánek, ‘Czech Republic’ in Kellermann, Czuczai and others (eds), Impact of EU Ac-
cession (n 8) 313, 317.
78  H. Koch, ‘The Danish Constitutional Order’ in Kellermann, De Zwaan, Czuczai (eds), 
EU Enlargement (n 8) 109, 110; A Usacka, ‘Latvia’ in Kellermann, Czuczai and others (eds) 
Impact of EU Accession (n 8) 369, 382.
79  Constitutional Court of Spain, Opinion on the consistency of the European Constitu-
tional Treaty with the Spanish Constitution, DTC 1/2004, 13 Dec 2004 with commentary 
by F Castillo de la Torre, 42 CMLRev (2005) 1169.
80  J. Czuczai, ‘Hungary’ in Kellermann, Czuczai and others (eds), Impact of EU Accession 
(n 8) 343, 344 n 5.
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Austria, with its unique model of ‘total revision’, provides for another 
example, as does Estonia from the new Member States where an Act 
Supplementing the Constitution was adopted, a category not previously 
foreseen in the Constitution.
b) Practical impact
With these theoretical differences in mind, a comparison of the prac-
tical ratifi cation requirements reveals that there are basically three dif-
ferent levels.
In the Member States which apply their constitutional provisions as 
regards ratifi cation of international treaties, no additional procedural re-
quirements have to be met. Usually, a simple majority in Parliament is suf-
fi cient. The same is true for some ‘limitation of sovereignty’ countries, such 
as France and Italy or, exceptionally, a country with a ‘common exercise of 
powers’ clause, such as Portugal. However, if the treaty contains certain 
provisions with constitutional impact, the situation becomes more compli-
cated. Then, prior constitutional amendments must be adopted through a 
complex procedure, as happened in France and Portugal in 1992. 
The Member States with a ‘transfer of powers’ or a ‘common exer-
cise of powers’ clause have grown continuously over time and represent 
a large majority today. With the exception of Portugal, the use of such 
clauses entails considerable procedural consequences. Either the quorum 
in Parliament increases (Luxemburg, Netherlands, Germany, Greece, 
Spain, Sweden, Bulgaria, or Romania) or the possibility arises to hold a 
binding referendum. The latter possibility was traditionally used only in 
Denmark by way of constitutional custom. However, more recently, re-
course to referenda has also been exercised in a number of new Member 
States, either in addition (Latvia, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia) or as 
an alternative (Poland, Czech Republic) to the parliamentary vote. 
Austria, Ireland and Estonia applied the most cumbersome - and 
very distinct - procedures to bring about their respective EU member-
ship. Ireland inserted an amendment to its constitution, necessitating 
a referendum. Austria, for its part, combined a very cumbersome pro-
cedure to totally revise its Constitution through EU accession in 1995, 
not fi tting into any model. Estonia combined a constitutional revision 
together with a referendum on accession by putting two distinct ques-
tions to the people.
III. Domestic Rank of Community law
The above-mentioned theoretical and practical differences in the rat-
ifi cation procedures also have an impact on the domestic rank of Com-
munity law. 
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1. Member States with ratifi cation procedures relating to 
international treaties
In the old Member States, the constitutional provision on the rank 
of international treaties also determines the internal rank of Community 
law. 
In Finland, there is no constitutional provision on the rank of in-
ternational treaties in the national system. Since Finland is a tradition-
ally dualist country, treaties would gain the same rank as the national 
act whereby they are incorporated.81 However, as the Accession Act was 
adopted by a law adopted with a constitutional majority in Parliament, 
this provided the Supreme Administrative Court with a basis to accept 
the supremacy of Community law over Finnish statutes.82 Whether that 
would also extend to the Constitution itself has not been tested yet;83 fur-
thermore, the new Article 94 (3) of the Constitution, according to which 
an international obligation shall not endanger the democratic foundation 
of the State, may well be used as a constitutional reserve at some stage. 
In the United Kingdom, where a written constitution with the highest 
normative rank is missing, the European Communities Act transposes 
European law into British law with the rank of a statute. Nevertheless, 
as can be drawn from the ECA, any subsequent British Statute shall be 
construed in a way that conforms to the obligations arising under EC 
law. Theoretically, the situation could arise that a statute adopted later in 
time runs deliberately contrary to EC law. In such a situation, the British 
law would have to be applied, as Lord Denning held in the famous case 
Macarthys v. Smith.84 Or, the ECA could be interpreted as a voluntary 
self-limitation of Parliament, as Lord Bridge held in Factortame (No. 2).85 
However, as the latter view was not endorsed by the other Lords, the Brit-
ish situation remains open to future developments.86
The situation is less clear in the new Member States. International 
treaties become part of Maltese law when they are incorporated by an 
Act of Parliament. The Act may also determine its relationship with oth-
er Maltese statutes. Inspired by the model of Act XIV on the European 
Convention, section 3 (2) of the European Union Act of 16 July 2003 
81  Antero Jyränki, Uusi perustuslakimme (Turku, 2000) 73-74. See also Article 94 of the 
new Finnish Constitution cited above.
82  Supreme Administrative Court, 31 December 1996, KHO 1996 B 577.
83  Griller (n 35) 167-168.
84  [1979] 3 All ER 325.
85  [1991] AC 603, at 658.
86  A Dashwood, ‘The British Way: The Cohabiting with Community Law’ in Kellermann, de 
Zwaan, Czuczai (eds) (n 8) 81, 87.
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provides for the supremacy of Community law over other Maltese laws;87 
furthermore, Article 65 of the Maltese Constitution, as amended, makes 
European law supreme over any subsequent law passed by the Maltese 
Parliament, with the effect that no lex posterior rule could apply.88 On 
the other hand, given the fact that Section 6 of the Maltese Constitution 
on the supremacy of the Constitution remained deliberately intact, it is 
likely that European law will not supersede the Constitution itself. 
In Cyprus, the starting point was quite similar. Certain international 
treaties become applicable in Cyprus if ratifi ed by an Act of Parliament 
and published in the Offi cial Gazette. Under Article 169 (3) they prevail 
over ‘municipal law’. Cypriot jurisprudence89 specifi es that this principle 
does not touch upon the supremacy of the Constitution laid down in 
Article 179 (1) of the Constitution. Rather, the term ‘municipal law’ in 
Article 169 (3) refers to ordinary statutes and regulations. Hence, rati-
fi ed international treaties enjoy a rank over other statutes, but below 
the Constitution. The EU Accession Act did not change this situation. 
Under Section 4,90 the Treaty of Accession only supersedes other legisla-
tive or regulatory acts. The shortcomings of this approach, however, soon 
became apparent in a case involving a Cypriot citizen whose transfer to 
the UK was demanded by British authorities according to the European 
Arrest Warrant.91 As Article 11 of the Cypriot Constitution contained a 
provision according to which Cypriot citizens cannot be extradited, the 
Supreme Court of Cyprus confi rmed the non-extradition of the person. 
That decision was in conformity with Cypriot law, but in defi ance of EU 
law. Thereafter, on 28 July 2006, the (Greek Cypriot members92 of the) 
87  Section 3 of Act V 2003, the Maltese European Union Act, provides: ‘(1) From the fi rst 
day of May 2004, the Treaty and existing and future acts adopted by the European Union 
shall be binding on Malta and shall be part of the domestic law thereof under the conditions 
laid down in the Treaty. (2) Any provision of any law which from the said date is incompat-
ible with Malta’s obligations under the Treaty or which derogates from any right given to 
any person by or under the Treaty shall to the extent that such law is incompatible with 
such obligations or the extent that it derogates from such rights be without effect and un-
enforceable.’
88  PG Xuereb ‘Malta’ in Kellermann, Czuczai and others (eds), Impact of EU Accession (n 
8) 409, 411.
89  See Eracleous v.The Municipality of Limassol (Appel No 5793) Judgment of the Supreme 
Court of 14 December 1993. 
90  Section 4 of the EU Accession Act (Law 4(III)/2003) states: ‘The rights and obligations 
imposed by the Treaty shall have direct effect in the Republic and supremacy over any leg-
islative or regulatory act providing to the contrary.’
91  Framework decision No 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest war-
rant and other surrender procedures between Member States, OJ 2002, L 190, 1.
92  Under Article 182 of the Cypriot constitution, amendments need to be approved by a 
majority vote comprising at least two-thirds of the total representatives belonging to the 
Greek Cypriot community and at least two-thirds of the number of Representatives belong-
ing to the Turkish Cypriot community. However, the Supreme Court of Cyprus accepted 
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House of Representatives passed a constitutional amendment.93 Under 
the new Article 1a) of the Cyprus Constitution, none of its provisions 
prevent Regulations, Directives or other acts or binding measures of a 
legislative nature enacted by the European Union or by the European 
Communities or by their institutions or bodies from having legal force in 
the Republic. 
Finally, under Article 138 (3) of the Lithuanian Constitution, inter-
national agreements which are ratifi ed by Parliament shall be a constitu-
ent part of the national legal system. The Constitutional Court clarifi ed in 
1995 that they would have to be applied ‘in the same way as legislation’.94 
Whereas this dictum could have opened the door for a lex posterior situ-
ation, Article 11 (2) of the Law on International Treaties, as amended in 
1999, established that international treaties enjoy priority over laws and 
other legal acts of the Republic. While that rule applies to all international 
treaties, the same result is now expressly foreseen for European law un-
der Section 2 of the EU Constitutional Act of 2004.95 However, since the 
Constitution is not mentioned, the principle of constitutional supremacy 
as laid down in Article 7 (1) of the Lithuanian Constitution appears to be 
still in place also with regard to European law.96 
2.  Member States with limitation of sovereignty clauses 
In Italy, Article 11 of the Constitution provided the Italian courts 
with a basis to recognise the supremacy of Community law over national 
legislation over time.97 However, when it comes to constitutional law, the 
Italian Constitutional Court keeps a fundamental reserve on the protec-
tion of human rights.98 In Greece, case law accepts the supremacy of 
that amendments can be passed in the absence of Turkish Cypriot Representatives on the 
basis of the doctrine of necessity. For more details, see C Patsalides, ‘Accommodating the 
Principle of Supremacy of Community Law to the Cypriot Legal Order - the Necessity for a 
Constitutional Amendment’, 12 European Public Law (2006) 363, 368-370.
93  The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution Act of 2006, No 127 (I) 2006 of 28 July 2006.
94  Constitutional Court of Lithuania, Opinion of 24 January 1995, No 9-199.
95  Article 2 of the Constitutional Act of 13 July 2004 reads: ‘The norms of the acquis of the 
European Union shall be an integral part of the legal order of the Republic of Lithuania. 
Where it follows from the founding Treaties of the European Union, the norms of the acquis 
shall apply directly, while in the event of a confl ict between legal norms, the norms of the 
acquis shall prevail over the laws and other legal acts of the Republic of Lithuania.’
96  I Jarukaitis (n 75) 394.
97  Corte Costituzionale, Granital/Amm. Finanze, no 170-1984, Giurisprudenze costituzi-
onale 1984, 1098, 5.6.1984. For more details, see M Cartabia, ‘The Italian Constitutional 
Court and the Relationship between the Italian Legal System and the European Union’ in 
A-M Slaughter, A Stone Sweet and JHH Weiler (eds), The European Court & National Courts 
- Doctrine and Jurisprudence (Oxford, Hart Publishing 1998) 133ff.
98  See the decision of the Italian Constitutional Court, Fragd/Ammin. Finanze, No 232 of 
21.4.1989, Rivista di diritto internazionale, 1989, 103, commented by Henry G. Scherm-
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Community law over Greek statutes by virtue of Article 28 of the Con-
stitution;99 however, doctrine is divided whether such supremacy would 
also extend to constitutional law itself.100
3. Member States with transfer or delegation of powers clauses
In the large second group of Member States, respective constitu-
tional clauses allowing for a transfer or delegation of powers determine 
the internal rank of Community law as follows.
In the Netherlands, Article 94 of the Constitution provides that su-
pranational law enjoys precedence over national law.101 In Germany, both 
the old general transfer of powers clause (Article 24 GG) and the new Eu-
rope clause (Article 23 GG) have been interpreted to allow for the suprem-
acy of Community law domestically.102 However, the German Constitu-
tional Court also reserved its right to reject the application of Community 
law as supreme if the protection of human rights in the Community legal 
order would fall short of a standard that is essentially comparable to the 
national standard.103 In Denmark, neither Paragraph 20 of the Constitu-
tion nor the Danish Act of Accession addresses the issue of supremacy, 
although the doctrine was known and recognised in parliamentary de-
bates in 1972.104 The Danish Constitutional Court did not take a stance 
on this question either, but underlined that a piece of Community law 
could be inapplicable in Denmark if the Community had transgressed 
its delegated powers and the issue was not satisfactorily resolved by the 
European Court of Justice.105 The Swedish jurisprudence acknowledges 
the supremacy of Community law over statutes and the Constitution it-
ers: ‘The Scales at Balance, National Constitutional Court v. Court of Justice’ 27 CMLRev 
(1990) 97-105.
99  Council of State Decision 2152/1986. See for more details V Cristianos, ‘Les juridic-
tions helléniques face à la primauté du droit communautaire’ 6 RFDA (1990) 969, 972 with 
further references.
100  K Chryssogonos, ‘The European Union and the Greek Constitutional Order’ in Keller-
mann, De Zwaan and Czuczai, EU Enlargement (n 8) 141, 142.
101  Article 94 of the Dutch constitution. 
102  Constitutional Court Decisions (BVerfGE) 22, 293 (296); 31, 145 (173). For a discussion 
of the constitutional situation in Germany, see I Pernice, ‘Article 23 GG, Commentary’ in H 
Dreier (ed) Grundgesetz-Kommentar, (Tübingen 2006) paras 27-32.
103  Decision of the German Constitutional Court of 1991 (BVerfGE 89, 155 - Maastricht) 
and decision of 7 June 2000 (Bananas), commented by F. Hoffmeister, 38 CMLRev (2001) 
791; the Swedish Constitution (Chapter 10, § 5 2nd sentence) contains a similar reserve in 
regard to human rights standards. 
104  Koch (n 78) 112.
105  Decision of the Danish Supreme Court of 6 April 1998 - Maastricht, with German trans-
lation in EuGRZ 1999, 50 et seq and commentary by F Thomas, ‘Das ‘Maastricht-Urteil des 
dänischen Obersten Gerichtshofs vom 6. April 1998’ 58 ZaöRV (1988) 879-906.
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self;106 however, as Chapter 10, Article 5 also includes the requirement 
that the transfer of powers should be compatible with the protection of 
fundamental rights, it is not excluded that a constitutional reserve may 
be activated at some stage in this fi eld if the Community standards were 
perceived to fall short of them.
According to Article 91 (3) of the Polish constitution,107 the laws es-
tablished by an international organisation to which Poland has trans-
ferred powers shall have precedence in the event of a confl ict of laws if 
the agreement establishing the international organisation so provides. As 
this provision does not go so far as to accept the precedence of European 
law over Polish constitutional law, the constitutionality of European law 
may be put at stake before the Polish Constitutional Court.108 Indeed, in 
the decision of 11 May 2005 on the Accession Treaty,109 the constitutional 
justices verifi ed whether the Accession Treaty and the Founding Treaties 
were consistent with the Polish Constitution. They found that the delega-
tion of competences to an international organisation may not be contrary 
to the Constitution being the supreme law of the Republic according to 
its Article 8. If there was a confl ict between a Community norm and the 
Polish Constitution, the Nation as the sovereign would have to decide 
on amending the Constitution, or on causing modifi cations within Com-
munity provisions or, ultimately, on Poland’s withdrawal from the EU.110 
Nevertheless, the Court also emphasised that one could not simply ap-
ply Polish constitutional law to assess the specifi cs of the Community 
legislative system.111 Accordingly, Community law cannot be challenged 
as unconstitutional because of the genuine Community decision-mak-
ing system. Rather, the constitutional reserve could only become valid 
with respect to substantive issues of Community law. Where there are 
no fundamental doubts in this regard, Polish Courts are obliged not to 
apply national statutes that violate directly applicable Community law. 
Preliminary references on such confl icts should be directed to the Euro-
106  Supreme Administrative Court, Judgment of 25 November 1997, Case 219/97, Las-
sagard.
107  Article 91 (3) of the Polish Constitution reads: ‘If an agreement, ratifi ed by the Republic 
of Poland, establishing an international organisation so provides, the laws established by it 
shall be applied directly and have precedence in the event of a confl ict of laws.’
108  W Czaplinski, ‘L’intégration européenne dans la constitution polonaise de 1997’ Revue 
du Marché Commun (2000) 168, 172.
109  Constitutional Tribunal, Judgment of 11 May 2005, K 18/04, English translation avail-
able at <http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/eng/summaries/wstep_gb.htm> 
110  Ibid para 13.
111  Ibid para 21: ‘The formal requirements for adopting Polish law, as specifi ed in the 
Polish constitution are not directly applicable to the procedures and principles governing 
the adoption of Community law.’
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pean Court of Justice, and not to the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, as 
the latter has confi rmed recently.112 
The Czech experience points in the same direction. A government 
proposal on a new Article 10b of the Constitution, which foresaw suprem-
acy over national law, including constitutional law,113 was not adopted 
in the Parliament. Rather, the modifi ed Article 10 of the Czech Consti-
tution only provides for supremacy over domestic statutes.114 Although 
the wording ‘statute’ (zakón) could refer to ordinary and constitutional 
statutes (ustavni zakón) alike, the Czech Constitutional Court made it 
clear that EC law does not enjoy unfettered supremacy. In its decision on 
‘Sugar Quota II’,115 the Court found in March 2006 that the conferral of 
powers to the EC was conditional. The original bearer of sovereignty, as 
well as the powers fl owing therefrom, still remains the Czech Republic, 
whose sovereignty is still founded upon Article 1 (1) of the Czech Con-
stitution. In the Court’s view, the conditional nature of the delegation of 
these powers manifests itself in the function of the Court to protect con-
stitutionalism (Article 83 of the Constitution). Therefore, the Court may 
verify whether the delegated powers are exercised in a manner that is 
compatible with the preservation and the foundations of state sovereignty 
of the Czech Republic, and in a manner that does not threaten the very 
essence of the substantive law-based State, given that the essentials of 
democracy are protected by Article 9 (2) of the Constitution even beyond 
the reach of the Constituent Assembly itself. However, on the facts of 
the case the Court did question that European institutions had touched 
upon those principles. Rather, the Court confi rmed that the contested 
sugar regulation should not have been adopted by the government, given 
that a directly applicable Commission regulation had already covered the 
fi eld. 
112  Constitutional Tribunal, Procedural Decision of 19 December 2006, Ref No P37/05 
<http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/eng/summaries/wstep_gb.htm> 
113  Article 10b of the proposal to amend the Czech Constitution provided: ‘The constitu-
tion and other constitutional rules, international treaties mentioned in Article 10, laws 
and regulations cannot be interpreted and applied inconsistently with obligations arising 
from the Czech membership in an international institution according to Article 10a.’ For a 
discussion of this proposal, see J Zemanek, ‘Auswirkungen des Gemeinschaftsrechts in der 
Tschechischen Republik nach ihrem Beitritt zur Europäischen Union’ in Walter Hallstein 
Institut für Europäisches Verfassungsrecht (ed), Verfassungsrechtliche Reformen zur Erwei-
terung der Europäischen Union (Nomos 2000) 157ff.
114  Article 10 of the Czech Constitution provides: ‘Published international treaties, whose 
ratifi cation Parliament approved and which are binding on the Czech Republic, shall be part 
of the Czech legal order; if the international treaty provides for a difference to a statute, the 
international treaty applies.’
115  Czech Constitutional Court, Pl. US 50/04, Judgment of 8 March 2006. English transla-
tion available at <http://test.concourt.cz/angl_verze/doc/p-50-04.html>
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In Latvia, despite the introduction of a delegation of power clause in 
Article 68 of the Constitution, ordinary rules for the domestic application 
of international treaties seem to apply. Under Article 13 of the Latvian 
Law on International Treaties, and Article 16 of the Law on the Consti-
tutional Court, international treaties fi gure above domestic statutes, but 
below the national Constitution.116 It remains to be seen whether judi-
cial practice will alter this general rule as regards EC law in view of the 
special procedures in the course of EU accession (obligatory referendum 
plus adoption of the ratifi cation bill with a constitutional majority).  
The Constitution is more explicit in Bulgaria. Also after the intro-
duction of Article 4 (3) on the participation of Bulgaria in the European 
Union and the transfer of power clause in Article 85 (3), the supremacy of 
ratifi ed treaties is limited to national statutes under Article 5 (4). Moreo-
ver, the Constitution needs to be amended under Article 85 (3) before 
ratifying unconstitutional treaties. Finally, the Constitutional Court has 
the power to review the constitutionality of international treaties under 
Article 149 (1) count 4 of the Constitution; in practice, the Court has con-
fi rmed the supremacy of the Constitution over international treaties.117 A 
combined reading of these provisions and the practice of the Court sug-
gest that Community law will be accorded a rank above national statutes, 
but below the Constitution.118
4. Member States with common exercise of powers clauses 
In the old Member States, the common exercise of powers clauses 
are the constitutional basis for applying Community law with precedence 
over national statutes. Jurisprudence can be found to that effect in Bel-
gium,119 Luxemburg,120 Portugal121 and Spain.122 The situation is less 
116  See D Luters-Thümmel, ‘International Agreements in the Legal Order of the Candidate 
Countries, Latvia’ in A Ott, K Inglis (eds), Handbook on European Enlargement (Asser Press 
2002) 267, 270-271.
117  Constitutional Court of Bulgaria, Decision 7 of 2 July 1992, Offi cial Gazette (DV) 
56/92.
118  E Tanchev, ‘Constitutional Amendments Due to Bulgarian Full EU Membership’ in Kel-
lermann, De Zwaan and Czuczai (eds) EU Enlargement (n 8) 301, 305.
119  Cour de Cassation, Arrêt du 27 mai 1971, Etat belge v Fromagerie franco-suisse Le Ski, 
JT, 1971, 471. See K Lenaerts, ‘The Application of Community Law in Belgium’ 23 CMLRev 
(1986) 253-286. The decision relates to former Article 25bis of the Belgian Constitution 
(today Article 34). 
120  Conseil d’Etat, Affaire Bellion et consorts v Ministre de la Fonction Publique; 21.11.1984, 
Pasicrisie Luxemb. XXVI 174.
121  Moura Ramos (n 33) 136.
122  Tribunal Supremo, 28.4.1987 - Ar. 4499-; 17.4.1989 - AR. 4524 - ; 24.4.1990 - AR. 
2747; 30.11.1990 - Noticias CEE Nr 83 (1991), 121. For more details, see G. Garzon Cla-
riana, ‘The Spanish Constitutional Order’ in Kellermann, De Zwaan and Czuczai (eds), EU 
Enlargement (n 8) 121-125.
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clear when it comes to confl icts with constitutional law. Here, the com-
mon exercise of powers clause may seem apt for a Community-friendly 
solution,123 but this is open to interpretation. In a similar vein, French 
civil and administrative courts were prepared to provide for the suprem-
acy of international law (including European law) over national statutes 
under Article 55 of the Constitution;124 more recently, the Conseil Consti-
tutionnel referred to Article 88-1 on the common exercise of powers in the 
European Union as the legal basis for a constitutional duty to implement 
Community directives, unless they are contrary to an express provision 
of the French Constitution.125 Furthermore, in its decision on the Treaty 
establishing a European Constitution, the highest French judicial body 
held that several provisions of constitutional value enable France to par-
ticipate in the creation and development of the European Union and that 
Article 88-1 acknowledges the principle of primacy of Union law;126 how-
ever, ‘when commitments entered into for such purpose contain a clause 
running counter to the Constitution, call into question constitutionally 
guaranteed rights and freedoms or adversely affect the fundamental con-
ditions of exercising national sovereignty, authorisation to ratify such 
measures shall require a prior revision of the Constitution.’127 This recalls 
the French position to insist on constitutional supremacy over European 
law on the one hand, but to require on the other hand a prior constitu-
tional adaptation in order to harmonise both legal orders. 
In the Slovak Republic, the precedence of European law is estab-
lished over national laws. Article 7 (2) second sentence of the Constitu-
tion provides for the supremacy of ‘legally binding acts of the European 
Communities and the European Union’.128 In as much as that provision 
was only to cover secondary law, but not the founding treaties,129 the pri-
macy of primary law would be guaranteed by Article 7 (5) of the Constitu-
123  Cf, for example, the respective doctrine referred to by Moura Ramos for Article 7 (6) of 
the Portuguese Constitution  (n 33) 136.
124  See Cour de Cassation, Cafés Jaques Vabres, Judgment of 24 May 1975, English trans-
lation in 2 CMLRev (1976) 336, and Conseil d’Etat, Nicolo, Judgment of 20 October 1989, 
English translation in 27 CMLRev (1990) 17. 
125  Conseil Constitutionnel, Décision No 2004-496 DC of 10 June 2004 para 7 <http://
www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr> and commentary by J. H. Reestman, 1 EuConst (2005) 
302. 
126  Conseil Constitutionnel, Décision No 2004-505 DC of 19 November 2004, paras 6 and 
13 <http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr> and discussed by F. Mayer, ‘Europarecht als 
französisches Verfassungsrecht’ 39 Europarecht (2004) 921.
127  Ibid para 7.
128  Article 7 (2) second sentence of the Slovak Constitution stipulates: ‘Legally binding acts 
of the European Communities and the European Union shall have precedence over the laws 
of the Slovak Republic.’
129  See M Slastan, ‘Slovakia’ in Kellermann, Czuczai and others (eds) Impact of EU Acces-
sion (n 8) 437, 444-445.
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tion relating to international treaties. In contrast, it follows from Article 
125 (1) (a) of the Slovak Constitution on the powers of the Constitutional 
Court that that there is no supremacy of European law over the Constitu-
tion and constitutional laws.130 
Similarly, Article 145 (1) of the Romanian Constitution explicitly ac-
cords supremacy of Community law over national statutes, but equally 
provides for a preliminary review of the constitutionality of treaties (Article 
11 (3)). Once it has been found constitutional it can no longer be subject 
to an objection of unconstitutionality (Article 145 (3)). This suggests that 
Community law is posited between constitutional and statutory law. 
In contrast, the new Article 3a (3) of the Slovene Constitution131 is 
more open to interpretation. As the text refers to the legal force of legal 
acts from international organisations to which Slovenia has transferred 
the exercise of parts of its powers ‘in accordance with the legal regula-
tions of the organisation’, one may argue on the one hand that Slovene 
constitutional law provides for the supremacy of Community law over na-
tional statutory and constitutional law alike. On the other hand, the Slov-
enian Constitutional Court had found - prior to the amendment - that 
any confl ict between the Constitution and an international treaty must 
be solved in favour of the Constitution. In order to ratify unconstitutional 
treaties, a prior amendment of the Constitution is necessary.132 When the 
view is taken that the new Article 3a of the Constitution did not change 
the situation,133 the Slovene Constitution would also enjoy supremacy 
over the Treaty of Accession in line with that earlier jurisprudence. In a 
recent case,134 Article 3a was invoked by an applicant to challenge a de-
cision not to nominate him for the Eurojust Joint Supervisory Board as 
he did not meet the minimum age of 40 years set in domestic legislation. 
The Constitutional Court did not, however, decide on the interpretation 
of that clause, as there was no confl ict between European law and the 
Slovenian legislation. As the Council decision itself of 28 February 2002 
establishing Eurojust foresaw that each Member State appoints mem-
130  Slastan (n 129) 442.
131  Article 3a (3) of the Slovenian Constitution reads: ‘Legal acts and decisions adopted 
within international organisations to which Slovenia has transferred the exercise of part of 
its sovereign rights shall be applied in Slovenia in accordance with the legal regulations of 
these organisations.’
132  Constitutional Court of Slovenia, Case No RM-1/97, Offi cial Gazette No 40/97. The 
decision is available in English at <http://www.us.-rs.si/en/index.html> para 12.
133  M Pogacnik, M Starman, P Vehar, ‘Slovenia’ in Kellermann, Czuczai and others (eds) 
Impact of Enlargement (n 8) 179, 185.
134  Constitutional Court of Slovenia, Case No U-I-120/04, Offi cial Gazette No 82/2004. The 
case is reported by J Czuczai, ‘Impact of European Integration on the Role and Functioning 
of the National Judiciary’ in Kellermann, Czuczai and others (eds), Impact of EU Accession 
(n 8) 267, 270-271.
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bers ‘in accordance with its legal system’, the constitutional complaint 
was inadmissible.
Finally, the Constitution of Hungary keeps silent on the question of 
which rank to accord Community law as part of domestic law, despite 
the fact that Article 2A on the common exercise of powers was inserted. 
A government proposal of October 2002, according to which precedence 
over all Hungarian law would have been accepted, did not fi nd suffi -
cient support in Parliament.135 Rather, the bill of November 2002136 which 
Parliament passed with several amendments as Act No. LXI/2002 left 
the issue deliberately open, as the opposition party argued against the 
supremacy of European law over the Hungarian Constitution.137 The in-
terpretation of the new Europe clause by the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court has thus become crucial. While the Court ignored the implications 
of European law in an early case of April 2004,138 it interpreted Article 2A 
in a landmark decision of 28 February 2006.139 The question before it was 
whether the National Election Board was right in rejecting a popular initi-
ative to call upon Parliament to adopt a scheme under which at least half 
of the agricultural products traded in Hungary were to be produced in 
Hungary. While the Board argued that Parliament could not adopt such 
a scheme as it would be contrary to Article 2A of the Constitution and the 
free movement of goods under Article 28 EC, the Court found that the 
power of Parliament to enact laws under Article 19 (3) was not restricted 
by Article 2A. This ruling seems to highlight the specifi c understanding 
of the common exercise of powers clause: competence to enact laws has 
not been totally given up in areas covered by Community law; rather, the 
clause would ensure that in the case of confl ict, Community law would 
135  The government had proposed inserting the following Article 2A (2) into the constitu-
tion: ‘In the Republic of Hungary the community law and other accomplishments of the Eu-
ropean Union shall be implemented in accordance with the accession acts to the European 
Union and the doctrines stemming from those.’ See Draft Bill No 1114/2002, tabled on 15 
October 2002.
136  Draft Bill No 1270/2002, tabled on 5 November 2002.
137  J Czuczai, ‘Hungary’ in Kellermann, Czuczai and others (eds), Impact of EU Accession 
(n 8) 343, 346.
138  The case is commented upon by R Uitz, ‘EU Law and the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court: Lessons of the First Post-Accession Encounter’ in Sadurski, Ziller and Zurek (eds), 
Après Enlargement (n 8) 41-64; A. Sajó, ‘Learning Co-operative Constitutionalism the Hard 
Way: the Hungarian Constitution Court Shying Away from EU Supremacy’ 2 Zeitschrift für 
Staats- und Europawissenschaften (2004) 351. For a discussion of this case in a broader 
context, see A Albi ‘Supremacy of EC Law in the New Member States - Bringing Parliaments 
into the Equation of  “Co-operative Constitutionalism”’ 3 European Constitutional Law Re-
view (2007) 55-62.
139  Constitutional Court Ruling No 10/2006 (II.28) and reported by J Czuczai, ‘Ratifi cation 
of the European Constitution in Hungary: Problems and Challenges’ in A Albi and J Ziller 
(eds), The European Constitution and National Constitutions: Ratifi cation and Beyond (Klu-
wer 2007) 29, 35-36. 
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prevail over domestic statutes. However, the latter point has not yet been 
spelt out by the Hungarian Constitutional Court. Neither did the Court 
shed light on the domestic rank of Community law in another decision 
of 15 December 2006, where it was confronted with the direct applicabil-
ity of the Community Working Time Directive 93/104.140 Accordingly, in 
the absence of any statement to the contrary, it appears that Hungarian 
judges would have to apply the Hungarian Constitution as the supreme 
law of the land for the time being, as laid down in its Articles 50 (3) and 
77. 
5. Member States with special constitutional procedures
In Ireland, the special ratifi cation procedure involving a referendum 
has led to a rather unique clause accepting the supremacy of European 
law. Under its Article 29 (4) (8), no provision of the Irish Constitution 
invalidates laws enacted, acts done, or measures adopted by the State 
which are necessitated by the obligations of membership of the Euro-
pean Union or of the Communities, or prevents laws enacted, acts done, 
or measures adopted by the European Union or by the Communities or 
institutions thereof from having the force of law. This is a rather gener-
ous acceptance of supremacy. In practice, there may only be debate on 
whether an Irish measure was ‘necessary’ to profi t from constitutional 
immunity.141 In Austria, the very fact that EU accession entailed a total 
revision of the Constitution led to the rather straightforward supreme 
application of Community law over Austrian law by the Austrian Consti-
tutional Court.142 Likewise, according to § 2 of the Constitution of the Re-
public of Estonia Amendment Act, adopted by way of a referendum, the 
Constitution shall be applied with due regard to the obligations arising 
from the Accession Treaty.143 As the Accession Treaty is the basis for the 
supremacy of Community law, this provision could be read as accepting 
the latter’s precedence over Estonian constitutional and statutory law, 
as indicated by the Chancellor of Justice in a Supreme Court Case of 
April 2005.144 Indeed, in its opinion of 11 May 2006, the Supreme Court’s 
140  Constitutional Court Ruling No 72/2006 (XII.25), discussed by A Raisz, ‘Confronted 
with Direct Applicability of a Directive: the Hungarian Constitutional Court Before Chal-
lenges’ in 4 Miskolc Journal of International Law (2007) 113-127, 124-125. The article is 
available online at <http://www.mjil.hu> 
141  For further details, see Hogan (n 27) 93-97.
142  Verfassungsgerichtshof, B 1625/98, Judgment of 24 February 1999; reported by Griller 
(n 35) 153.
143  § 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia Amendment Act stipulates: ‘When 
Estonia belongs to the European Union, the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia shall be 
applied with due regard to the rights and duties arising from the Accession Treaty’
144  See below Section IV 1. 
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constitutional chamber found that the Supplementing Act should be read 
together with the text of the Constitution, so that those parts of the Con-
stitution that are incompatible with Community law cannot be applied.145 
Accordingly, the Chamber found that the Draft Act Amending the Bank 
of Estonia Act to prepare the country’s adoption of the Euro was consti-
tutional, although Article 111 of the Estonian Constitution accords the 
exclusive right to issue Estonian currency to the Bank of Estonia. 
6. Analytical comparison 
With respect to the domestic status of Community law accorded by 
national constitutions, two levels should be distinguished: statutes and 
constitutional law.
In the overwhelming majority of Member States, the supremacy of 
Community law over domestic statutes is well established under their 
constitutional systems. Irrespective of different concepts such as limi-
tation of sovereignty, transfer/delegation of powers, or common exercise 
of powers, specifi c integration clauses share the same basic function, 
namely to provide for a constitutional basis for EU membership and to al-
low for the reception of the primacy doctrine by the jurisprudence.146 This 
is particularly obvious where such clauses do not refer to international 
organisations in general, but specifi cally to the European Union, thereby 
taking account of the special characteristics of Community law.147 Having 
been inspired by different examples from the old Member States, most 
new Member States amended their constitutions and inserted new inte-
gration clauses. These clauses generally spelt out the supremacy of Eu-
ropean law over domestic statutes; if not, this result can be inferred from 
the very function of these clauses. Even in those Member States which 
resort to constitutional clauses relating to the ratifi cation of international 
treaties, confl icts are usually resolved in favour of Community law. Either 
the relevant tradition allows for the supremacy of international treaty law 
over national statutes anyhow (Finland), or special efforts are undertaken 
in favour of Community law in order to overcome the otherwise applicable 
lex posterior rule (UK and Malta).
Irrespective of the existence (or not) of a specifi c integration clause, 
all Member States face the question about how to accommodate the prec-
edence of EC law over their national constitutional law. In this regard, 
three different models can be identifi ed. 
145  Opinion No 3-4-1-3-06 on the interpretation of Article 111 of the Estonian Constitution 
<http://www.nc.ee> 
146  De Witte (n 10) 69-71, with respect to the founding Member States.
147  I Pernice, ‘Multilevel Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: European Consti-
tution-making Revisited’ 36 CMLRev (1999) 713, 716.
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First, as was the practice in the old Member States of France and 
Spain, the constitution needed to be modifi ed prior to accepting a new 
European obligation, such as certain provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, 
which would run counter to the constitution. Strikingly, the overwhelm-
ing majority of new Member States also stick to the unfettered primacy 
of their constitution over European law, possibly for two main reasons. 
In political terms, against the backdrop of the former Soviet domina-
tion, the Baltic and Central and Eastern European constitutions protect 
sovereignty to a much higher degree than Western European constitu-
tions.148 Moreover, as a matter of legal tradition, the Kelsenian concept 
of a pyramid norm hierarchy had previously been lost under Communist 
rule and now holds the charm of being recently rediscovered;149 and this 
concept naturally places the State constitution on the top of the domestic 
pyramid.150 
Second, the opposite approach has been adopted by Ireland, where 
the Constitution itself contains a rule that Community law is applicable 
in the domestic system according to its own principles, including the 
rule of supremacy. Among the new Member States, this model seems 
to have inspired only Cyprus so far; the Estonian Act Supplementing 
the Constitution has been interpreted by the Estonian Supreme Court 
to grant unconditional supremacy to Community law as well.151 Certain 
formulations in the Slovenian integration clause may be open for similar 
interpretation. As in Austria, the very special ratifi cation procedures may 
serve as an additional argument to accord constitutional value to Com-
munity law in those constitutions.
Third, a middle way is to generally accept the supremacy of Com-
munity law over constitutional law by virtue of the integration clause, 
but to safeguard certain fundamental constitutional principles against 
the supremacy of Community law over domestic law with reference to 
148  A Albi, ‘“Europe” - Articles in the Constitutions of Central and Eastern European Coun-
tries’ 42 CMLRev (2005) 399, 403.
149  Z. Kühn, ‘The Application of European Law in the New Member States: Several (Early) 
Predictions’ 6 German Law Journal (2005) 563, 574.
150  This contribution does not discuss whether the Kelsenian concept is the correct theo-
retical approach to defi ne the relationship between European law and domestic law. For 
interesting theoretical propositions, see eg M Kumm, ‘The Jurisprudence of Constitutional 
Confl ict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe before and after the Constitutional Treaty’ 11 
European Law Journal (2005) 262. For views in favour of an approach based on the plural-
ism of coordinated legal orders rather than on a norm hierarchy in the Kelsenian sense, see 
I Pernice, ‘Das Verhältnis europäischer zu nationalen Gerichten im Europäischen Verfas-
sungsverbund’ <http://www.whi-berlin.de> 1-55, 44ff with further references. 
151  A Albi ‘Supremacy of EC Law in the New Member States - Bringing Parliaments into the 
Equation of “Co-operative constitutionalism”’ 3 EuConst (2007) 45.
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the limits contained in the very same clauses.152 Such reserve powers 
could be exercised, for example, in Italy, Germany or Denmark. Inspired 
by these precedents, the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic fol-
lowed that direction as well. 
IV. Specifi c constitutional clauses relating to EU matters
The horizontal integration clauses discussed so far are by defi nition 
abstract norms. Where they provide for the supremacy of European law 
over constitutional law, there is no need to address specifi c subject mat-
ters of possible confl ict. However, where they preserve the possibility that 
constitutional law takes precedence over European law, it is necessary to 
introduce specifi c clauses relating to certain EU matters. Such specifi c 
constitutional clauses would then bring the national constitution in con-
formity with a particular piece of the acquis. For example, in France, any 
incompatibilities between a new EU treaty and the French Constitution 
regularly led to constitutional amendments to pave the way for ratifi ca-
tion. Likewise, the Polish Constitutional Court has explicitly reminded 
the national Parliament that any possible confl ict between European law 
and Polish constitutional law could be solved by changing the Polish Con-
stitution. Hence, it is useful to briefl y summarise the policy areas where 
specifi c constitutional clauses have been used in the past.153 
1. Voting rights
Under Article 19 (1) EC, every citizen of the Union residing in a Mem-
ber State of which he is not a national shall have the right to vote and to 
stand as a candidate at municipal elections in the Member State where 
he resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State. From 
the domestic perspective, there is an EU obligation to grant the right to 
vote in municipal elections to EU foreigners. 
However, under many constitutions the right to vote is reserved for 
nationals only, irrespective of whether the elections take place at national 
or local level. On the other hand, granting a constitutional right to na-
tionals may not necessarily imply that no right can be granted to non-na-
tionals by virtue of EU law. That was, for example, the view of the Polish 
Constitutional Court with respect to Article 62 (1) of the Polish constitu-
152  De Witte (n 10) 76 has called this the ‘double capacity’ of the integration clauses, 
namely to allow on the one hand for the smooth integration of EC law into the national 
legal system, and on the other hand to allow the constitutional courts to protect what they 
consider to be the core of the constitution against EU encroachments.
153  See also Albi (n 9) 42 CMLRev (2005) 419 and 401.
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tion.154 Similarly, the Estonian Chancellor of Justice argued before the 
Supreme Court that Article 48 (1) of the Estonian Constitution on the 
right of Estonian nationals to become members of political parties should 
be interpreted in the light of Article 19 EC by virtue of Article 2 of the Act 
Supplementing the Constitution so as to grant EU citizens that right as 
well.155 Nevertheless, in order to remove any interpretative uncertainties, 
several other EU Member States have opted to tackle the issue directly 
by modifying their respective constitutional provision on the right to vote. 
This was the case in Germany,156 Austria,157 Belgium,158 France,159 Portu-
gal,160 Spain,161 Hungary,162 Slovakia,163 Bulgaria,164 and Romania.165   
2. Extradition of nationals 
Under Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002,166 
whose validity has recently been confi rmed by the European Court of 
Justice,167 Member States are obliged to surrender persons to another 
Member State if the latter issues a European Arrest Warrant. The Frame-
work Decision does not allow for the protection of one’s own nationals. 
However, certain continental constitutional traditions incorporate a duty 
of the State to protect its own citizens from foreign criminal justice. Hence, 
a confl ict between the constitution norm prohibiting extradition and the 
European Arrest Warrant may arise.
154  Constitutional Tribunal, Judgment of 11 May 2005, K 18/04, English translation avail-
able at <http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/eng/summaries/wstep_gb.htm> para 27.
155  A Albi, ‘Estonia’ in Kellermann, Czuczai and others (eds), Impact of EU Accession (n 
8) 331, 337. The General Chamber of the Supreme Court decided on 19 April 2005 not to 
review Article 5 (1) of the Political Parties Act against norms of EU law, fi nding that it has 
no competence for such a review. Decision No 3-4-1-1-05, available in English at <http://
www.nc.ee> 
156  Article 28 (1) third sentence of the Grundgesetz.
157  Article 23a and 117 (2) of the Austrian Constitution.
158  Article 8 (3) of the Belgium Constitution.
159  Article 88-3 of the French Constitution.
160  Article 15 (4) of the Portuguese Constitution. 
161  Article 13 (2) of the Spanish Constitution.
162  Article 70 § 2 of the Hungarian Constitution.
163  Article 30 (1) of the Slovak Constitution. 
164  Article 42 (3) of the Bulgarian Constitution.
165  Article 16 (4) of the Romanian Constitution.
166  OJ 2002, L 190, 1.
167  ECJ, Case C-303/05, Judgment of the Grand Chamber of 3 May 2007, not yet reported, 
but available at <http://curia.europa.eu> 
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In order to prevent such confl icts, Slovenia,168 Bulgaria,169 and Ro-
mania170 modifi ed the relevant constitutional provision prior to EU ac-
cession. In others, where such laudable caution was not applied, the 
confl ict arose after accession. For example, as previously mentioned, the 
Supreme Court of Cyprus confi rmed in November 2005 that Cyprus was 
unable to render citizens to other EU Member States, even though this 
entails a breach of the Framework Decision. In reply to this judgment, 
Cyprus modifi ed its constitution. Next to the general EU clause already 
discussed, it modifi ed Article 11 (2) (f) of the Constitution dealing specifi -
cally with deportation and extradition. Subparagraph (i) now incorporates 
the exception that Cypriot citizens may be handed over to other EU Mem-
ber States on the basis of a European Arrest Warrant. Similarly, upon 
a fi nding of the Polish Constitutional Court that the surrender of Polish 
citizen to a Member State would run counter to Article 55 of the Polish 
Constitution,171 the latter was subsequently amended. Another solution 
was found by the Czech Constitutional Court: it declared that Article 14 
(4) of the Czech Charter on Fundamental Rights, according to which no 
one can be forced to leave his home country, has to be construed nar-
rowly and in accordance with EU law. That prohibition, according to the 
Court, was a reaction to the Communist crime to silence certain critics by 
forcing them to go abroad, but was not concerned with ordinary extradi-
tion cases. 
3. Acquisition of immovable property by foreigners
The free movement of capital implies the right to purchase immov-
able property in other EU Member States, subject only to restrictions 
that are necessary to protect public policy or public security (Articles 
56 and 58 (1) (b) EC). Community law therefore allows certain non-dis-
criminatory administrative practices regulating the purchase of immov-
able property. However, an outright prohibition for foreigners to buy land 
is not compatible with the internal market. This is why a number of new 
Member States have sought transitional periods in this area, hitherto 
incorporated in the Treaty of Accession.  
Nevertheless, once these transitional arrangements expire, consti-
tutional protection can no longer be invoked. Against that background, 
certain new Member States modifi ed the respective constitutional provi-
sion to allow for the purchase of land by EU citizens. Examples of such 
168  Article 47 of the Slovene Constitution.
169  Article 25 (3) of the Bulgarian Constitution.
170  Article 19 (1) of the Romanian Constitution.
171  Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Judgment of 27 April 2005, Case P 1/05, English trans-
lation available at <http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/eng/summaries/wstep_gb.htm>
94 Frank Hoffmeister: Constitutional Implications of EU Membership: A View from the Commission
modifi cations can be found in Slovenia,172 Lithuania,173 Romania,174 and 
in Bulgaria.175 
4. Economic and monetary union
Under the EC Treaty, responsibility for the common monetary policy 
is vested in the European Central Bank. This implies that no national 
authority exercises this function anymore in those Member States which 
form part of the Eurozone. Sometimes this consequence is specifi cally 
taken into account in national constitutions. Examples of this technique 
can be found in Germany,176 France,177 Portugal,178 and Greece.179 
Furthermore, under Article 109 EC, national central banks are inde-
pendent. This may have an impact on constitutional provisions dealing 
with the status of the Central Bank. If a domestic provision can be in-
terpreted as allowing for other state bodies to exert political infl uence on 
the bank, a confl ict with European law is likely to occur. However, in dis-
cerning whether a confl ict actually arises, not only the text of a provision 
implementing legislation and case law,180 but also constitutional practice 
is of importance. For example, Article 152 of the Slovene Constitution 
provides for the accountability of the bank to Parliament; under Article 
91 of the Finnish Constitution, Parliament supervises the central bank 
and has the right to be informed. Nevertheless, as constitutional practice 
in these countries shows, these provisions have not put into jeopardy the 
independence of the respective banks. Nevertheless, there may be a case 
to modify the relevant constitutional provisions in order to provide for the 
incontrovertible independence of the national bank if serious practical 
doubts remain on the proper understanding of an ambivalent constitu-
tional norm.
172  Article 68 of the Slovene Constitution.
173  Article 47 of the Lithuanian Constitution.
174  Article 41 (2) of the Romanian Constitution.
175  Article 22 of the Bulgarian Constitution.
176  Article 88, second sentence of the Grundgesetz.
177  Article 88-2, fi rst subparagraph of the French Constitution.
178  Article 102 of the Portuguese Constitution.
179  Article 80 (2) of the Greek Constitution.
180  Note, for example, that the Czech Constitutional Court nullifi ed certain provisions of the 
Amendment Act on the Czech National Bank (CNB) by reasoning that they were inconsist-
ent not only with the requirement of the independent status of the CNB as guaranteed by 
the Czech Constitution, but also with Article 108 EC. Case Pl. Us 59/2000, Collection of 
Constitutional Court Decisions, Vol 22, 249.
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5. Independence of the judiciary
According to Article 6 (1) EU, the European Union is founded on 
the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fun-
damental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to 
the Member States. As Article 49 EU directly refers to these principles as 
a criterion for accession, the European Union assesses whether a candi-
date country conforms to these principles prior to becoming a Member.181 
Consequently, there is a growing body of “constitutional acquis” which 
candidate countries need to take into account.182
On this basis, the independence of the judiciary occasionally caused 
concern for European institutions in the last round of accession.183 Cer-
tainly, there is no single European model how to organise the judiciary 
in an EU country. Nevertheless, the rule of law requirement embodies 
the principle of separation of powers. In turn, this necessitates a judici-
ary independent of other branches of government. As laid down in the 
jurisprudence of the Strasbourg organs with respect to Article 6 (1) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, Courts must be established by 
law;184 there shall be no discrimination in the appointment procedures of 
judges;185 the judiciary must not be infl uenced in its decision-making by 
either the executive or the legislature;186 judges must act impartially and 
be seen to do so; their conditions of tenure must be adequately ensured 
by law;187 the grounds for disciplinary action or removal from the post 
must be limited and laid down in the law.
181  For an interpretation of the constitutional dimension of the political accession criteria, 
see F Hoffmeister, ‘Changing Requirements for Membership’ in A Ott, K Kinglis (eds), Hand-
book on European Enlargement (Asser Press, 2002) 90, 93-96. 
182  For a defi nition of the notion ‘constitutional acquis’, see J Czuczai, ‘Practical Imple-
mentation by the Acceding Countries of the Constitutional Acquis of the EU - Problems and 
Challenges’ in Kellermann, De Zwaan and Czuczai, EU Enlargement (n 8) 411, 421.
183  In ‘“Europe” - Articles in the Constitutions of Central and Eastern European Constitu-
tions’ 42 CMLRev (2005) 415. Albi notes that it was a novelty of the last round of acces-
sion that the European Commission requested that provisions concerning the judiciary be 
amended. In fact, those requests were supported by the Council, as the latter adopted the 
Accession Partnerships and formulated negotiation positions on the basis of the Commis-
sion’s Regular Reports and Draft Common Positions. 
184  EComHR, Zand v. Austria, App No 7360/76, 15 DR 70 (1978).
185  ECtHR, Sramek v. Austria, Ser  A 84, §§ 41-42. 
186  ECtHR, Ringeisen v. Austria, Ser A 13, § 95; ECtHR, Piersack v. Belgium, Ser A 53, § 27; 
ECtHR, Beaumartin v. France, Ser A 296-B, § 38; ECtHR, Van de Hurk v. the Netherlands, 
Ser A 288, §§ 50-52.
187  ECtHR, Campbell and Fell vs. UK, Ser A 80, § 80: ‘It is true that the irremovability of 
judges by the executive during their term of offi ce must in general be considered as a corol-
lary of their independence and thus included in the guarantees of Article 6 (1). However, 
the absence of a formal recognition of this irremovability in the law does not in itself imply 
lack of independence provided that it is recognised in fact and that the other necessary 
guarantees are present.’
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Against this background, the Accession Partnership for Slovakia of 
December 1999 had laid down the short term priority to ‘strengthen the 
independence of the judiciary, in particular amend the constitution with 
regard to nomination and probationary system for judges.’188 This par-
tially explains the considerable number of amendments concerning the 
position of the judiciary in the 2001 constitutional reform of Slovakia.189 
Similarly, a signifi cant number of amendments of the 2003 constitutional 
package in Romania related to the judiciary,190 following relevant remarks 
in the European Commission Regular Reports on this country.191 The 
same can be said for Bulgaria, where a separate constitutional package of 
September 2003 was passed in order to comply with concerns from Brus-
sels. The reform limited the immunity for top-level magistrates, clarifi ed 
the conditions of removal and fi xed their terms of offi ce.192 Currently, 
many of these discussions are being conducted with Croatia and Turkey 
in a newly formed negotiation Chapter 23 called ‘judiciary and human 
rights’.
V. Conclusion
EU membership has a number of constitutional implications for the 
Member States. In order to apply European law domestically, many Mem-
ber States provide for a constitutional basis that defi nes the domestic 
applicability and rank of European law. To meet this challenge, there is a 
clear trend not to use existing constitutional clauses relating to interna-
tional treaties, international organisations or association of States. Rath-
er, new integration clauses are specifi cally designed for EU membership. 
Such EU integration clauses trigger specifi c ratifi cation procedures that 
go beyond ordinary parliamentary majorities, in many cases involving 
referenda. Since accession to the EU is then endowed with a particularly 
high degree of legitimacy, Member States also accept that Community 
law supersedes national law. Nevertheless, some constitutional reserves 
occasionally remain, in particular when the highest Courts of a country 
have a textual basis for arguing that certain constitutional essentials 
are not even open to change for the constitutional legislator. In such a 
scenario, the very same constitutional essentials are also safeguarded 
against a (theoretically) defi cient piece of Community law. 
188  The Accession Partnership of December 1999 is cited in the Commission’s Regular Re-
port on Slovakia’s Progress Towards Accession, 8 November 2000, 16.
189  Albi, EU Enlargement and the Constitutions of Central and Eastern Europe (n 9) 69.
190  For more details, compare V Duculescu, R Adam, ‘Romania’ in Kellermann, Czuczai and 
others (eds), Impact of EU accession (n 8) 113, 116 and 124-128.
191  Albi, EU Enlargement and the Constitutions of Central and Eastern Europe (n 9) 106.
192  For more details, compare E Tanchev, J Peteva, ‘Bulgaria’ in Kellermann, Czuczai and 
others (eds), Impact of EU Accession (n 8) 33, 45-46.
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In order to overcome confl icts between certain circumscribed mat-
ters of Community law and domestic constitutional law, many Member 
States have, in addition, introduced specifi c constitutional provisions 
that are limited to regulate these confl icts. It is wise to address these 
particular policy fi elds in advance of EU membership to avoid the embar-
rassing situation where national courts must apply the domestic consti-
tution instead of Community law. Rather than being forced to modify the 
constitution ex post under time pressure, preventive action seems to be 
more appropriate.
The European Commission does not prescribe a specifi c method on 
how a candidate should address these issues. Rather, during the nego-
tiations, it points to certain shortcomings as they arise in the negotiation 
chapters. There is an obligation of result to provide for the supremacy of 
Community law by accession. The choice on how and when to opt for a 
constitutional model which is best reconcilable with the candidate’s own 
national tradition certainly remains in the hands of the democratically 
elected representatives of the candidate country itself.193 
193  The same conclusion was reached vis-à-vis the previous enlargement by J Czuczai (n 
182) 411, 422.
